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RECOVERY AND ALLOCATION OF
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD MITIGATION
COSTS IN ELECTRIC UTILITY RATES
LISA M. BOGARDUS*
INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH there is no scientific basis to conclude that electromag-
etic fields ("EMFs")1 cause adverse health effects,2 EMFs are in-
creasingly a subject of controversy in various proceedings to which
electric utilities are a party. In these proceedings, stakeholders often de-
mand that utilities take precautionary measures to reduce public expo-
sure to EMFs because future studies may show that EMFs are harmful.
Some utilities refuse to take any action until the scientific research con-
clusively warrants it. Other utilities have adopted policies to minimize
EMFs, and in some states, EMF limits are regulatory requirements.
In the meantime, electric utilities are spending significant sums of
money on research, education programs, design changes, and litigation
* Attorney, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, New York, N.Y.; J.D. 1991, Co-
lumbia Law School; B.A. 1986, Indiana University; member of the New York State Bar.
The views set forth in this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
represent the views of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, or any attorneys thereof. The
author would like to thank Mark A. Warnquist, Ronald D. Jones, Chad M. Neuens, and
Kevin D. Leitdo for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. EMFs consist of electric and magnetic fields. Electric fields are created wherever
there is an electric charge, and magnetic fields are created wherever electric current flows.
Thus, EMFs are present wherever there is electricity, which in the United States is 60-
Hertz (Hz) alternating current. An EMF is part of a continuum of frequencies known as
the electromagnetic spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are the highest frequencies,
produced by, for example, gamma rays and x-rays, and at the opposite end are extremely
low frequencies produced by, for example, high-voltage transmission lines. Electric fields
are measured in kilovolts per meter (kV/m), and magnetic fields are measured in milli-
gauss (mG). For a more comprehensive discussion of EMFs, see U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Biological Effects of Power Frequency Electric and Magnetic
Fields (May 1989) [hereinafter "OTA Report"]; U.S. Dep't of Energy, Electrical and
Biological Effects of Transmission Liner A Review (1989).
2. See Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Health Effects of Low-Frequency Electric
and Magnetic Fields ES-11 (June 1992); Electromagnetic Fields and the Risk of Cancer, 3
Documents of the National Radiological Protection Board at I Ir 2 (1992). Although the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had concluded in its prelimi-
nary draft report on the potential carcinogenicity of EMFs that "magnetic fields from
power lines and perhaps other sources in the home [are] a possible, but not proven, cause
of cancer in humans," U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Evaluation of the Potential Carci-
nogenicity of Electromagnetic Fields, Review Draft at 1-5 (Oct. 1990), an EPA committee
concluded that the document contained "serious deficiencies and needs to be rewritten."
Nonionizing Elec. & Magnetic Fields Subcommittee, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, An
SAB Report" Potential Carcinogenicity of Electric and Magnetic Fields I (Jan. 1992). The
EPA's Office of Health and Environmental Assessment announced it would postpone the
production of a final EMF report indefinitely because EPA does not "see any big break-
throughs that would change the conclusions reached by other reviews." EPA Will Indefi-
nitely Postpone Final EMF Report, EMF News, Aug. 16, 1993, at 1.
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fees.3 This Article addresses who should pay for these costs-ratepayers,
utility investors, or both-when it is not known whether and to what
degree EMFs may be harmful. If EMFs are later determined to be harm-
ful, should a utility that could have mitigated harm earlier, but did not,
be allowed to pass on to ratepayers the added costs to reduce EMFs once
they have been determined to be harmful? If EMFs are later determined
to be benign, should utility investors pay for the costs of any preventative
measures implemented when the research was inconclusive, or should the
utility be allowed to include these costs in rate base and earn a return on
these EMF-related investments?
Part I of this Article describes the legal contexts in which EMF issues
affect electric utilities, such as certification and condemnation proceed-
ings. Part II discusses how regulators and utilities have responded to the
uncertainty of EMF health effects, and Part III analyzes possible
ratemaking treatment of EMF-related costs and investments for three
scenarios: (1) currently, when EMF health effects remain uncertain and
inconclusive; (2) if EMFs are later determined to be benign; and (3) if
EMFs are later determined to be harmful. Part IV offers a proposal for
the ratemaking treatment of EMF-related costs while the health effects of
EMFs remain uncertain.
I. LEGAL CONTEXTS IN WHICH EMF ISSUES AFFECT UTILITIES
The issue of whether EMFs are harmful has been considered in several
legal contexts involving electric utilities: (1) administrative proceedings
on applications for certificates to construct and operate transmission
lines, distribution lines, and substations; (2) condemnation actions by
utilities to acquire property for transmission line corridors or rights-of-
way; (3) personal injury or property damage lawsuits against utilities; (4)
legislative and rulemaking hearings and investigations concerning EMFs
from transmission and distribution lines; and (5) electric utility workers'
compensation cases. In the future, EMF issues also may arise in utility
insurance coverage cases and in rate-recovery cases, the latter of which
will be discussed in Part III.
A. Certification Proceedings
Before a utility can construct and operate a transmission line, the util-
ity must obtain approval, usually in the form of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity, from a state's utility commission.4 The com-
mission is typically prohibited by law from granting the certificate unless
the utility applicant demonstrates that there is a "need" for the transmis-
3. See $10 Billion a Year Could End EMF Exposure, Panel Told, 131 Pub. Util.
Fort., May 15, 1993, at 45; Philip S. McCune, The Power Line Health Controversy: Legal
Problems and Proposals for Reform, 24 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 429, 431 (1991).
4. See 3 David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, Energy Law & Transactions 80-56
to 80-57 (1993).
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sion line.' Some state legislation also requires the utility to demonstrate
that the route selected is "reasonable" and that the utility "considered"
or "minimized" environmental impacts from the line's construction and
operation.' In many states, the commission must hold a public hearing
on the application,' in which interested parties may submit testimony
and cross-examine witnesses.8
EMF issues commonly arise when a party opposed to a proposed line
asserts that the proposed line is unsafe because people near the line will
be exposed to EMFs.9 Those in opposition to the line typically argue
that the utility should either site the transmission line elsewhere or de-
sign it differently.10 Other opponents have requested a stay on the con-
struction of a proposed line" or a moratorium on all new lines until
further research is concluded.' 2
B. Condemnation Proceedings
In addition to obtaining a certificate to construct and operate a trans-
mission line, a utility will often need to acquire private property for the
5. See Edison Elec. Inst., Review of State-Level Electric Power Transmission Facility
Siting Processes, 1-2 to 1-3 (Apr. 10, 1990).
6. See Re New England Power Co., Nos. D.P.U. 89-163 to 89-166, 1993 WL
343567, at *3 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. June 25, 1993); Re Boston Edison Co., No.
D.P.U. 92-229-A, 1993 WL 343453, at *2 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. June 1, 1993).
7. See Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 5, at 111-5 to 111-6.
8. Regulation of transmission-facility siting varies considerably among the states. A
survey of regulatory approaches to transmission-facility siting discerned four types of
regulatory processes: (1) a regulatory "one-stop" process, in which comprehensive siting
legislation authorizes one agency to coordinate and oversee all permitting requirements;
(2) a regulatory "multi-stop" process, in which siting legislation exists, but permits are
required from more than one agency; (3) no siting regulations exist, but the utility must
demonstrate need for the line; and (4) neither siting nor certification requirements exist.
See Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 5, at II-1.
9. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. Similarly, another strategy for oppo-
nents to existing or proposed lines is to institute a complaint before a commission against
the utility for maintaining an allegedly unsafe transmission line. See Re Pinckney Neigh-
borhood Ass'n, No. 183,411-U, 1993 WL 217285, at *1 (Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1,
1993). Opponents have also alleged that the construction of a transmission line is unlaw-
ful. See Marzolf v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 92-03-001, 1994 WL 79786, at *1 (Cal.
P.U.C. Jan. 7, 1994) (alleging that environmental review is required before construction).
These strategies may be expressions of the "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome,
complaints common to most development projects.
10. See, eg., Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Town of Sevastopol, 105 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 45 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989) (order voiding a municipal ordi-
nance that required all new transmission lines to be built underground).
11. See, e.g., Re Consumers Power Co., 140 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 332, 338
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993); Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc. No. 7602, 1993 WL
306353, at *1 (Haw. P.U.C. May 10, 1993) (Commission ordered proposed commitment
of funds to construct a transmission line to be laid underground near pedestrian side-
walks suspended until the Commission had an opportunity to examine further the issue of
exposure of pedestrians to EMis).
12. See Re Ettelson, No. 93-0162-E-P, 1993 WL 263357, at *1 (WV. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Apr. 23, 1993); Re Pinckney Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 183,411-U, 1993 WL
217285, at *1 (Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1993).
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rights-of-way of a proposed line. State legislatures typically delegate the
power of eminent domain to utilities for this purpose, which utilities may
exercise after a certificate is issued.13
EMF issues often arise when a utility exercises its power of eminent
domain to take an easement through a property owner's land.14 Inverse
condemnation claims are also common, where a plaintiff alleges that a
nearby condemnation of property for the construction and operation of a
line will so adversely affect the value of the plaintiff's property so as to
require compensation. 5 In these cases, the landowner tries to establish
that buyers' fears of EMFs from the transmission line will lower the mar-
ket value of the landowner's remaining property, and therefore the land-
owner is entitled to severance damages. 6 In a recent New York case, the
state's highest court held that the property owner may establish conse-
quential damages with evidence that fear of the health risks from expo-
sure to transmission lines reduces the property's value without proving
that the fear is reasonable. 7
C. Personal Injury and Property Damage Cases
EMF personal injury cases usually involve claims that as a result of
exposure to EMFs from nearby transmission lines, the plaintiff has devel-
oped cancer or other injuries. 8 These plaintiffs have relied on theories of
strict product liability,' 9 strict liability for ultrahazardous activity, negli-
gence, duty to warn, misrepresentation, battery, negligent and intentional
13. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-8-1 (Bums 1991); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 361.01 (West
1968).
14. See Kristopher D. Brown, Note, Electromagnetic Field Injury Claims: Judicial
Reaction to an Emerging Public-Health Issue, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 325, 331 (1992); Todd D.
Brown, Comment, The Power Line Plaintiff and the Inverse Condemnation Alternative, 19
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 655, 668 (1992).
15. See Todd D. Brown, The Power Line Plaintiff and the Inverse Condemnation Al-
ternative, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 655, 668 (1992).
16. See McCartin v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No. 699949 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 13,
1994); David Z. Kaufman, Comment, Efficient Compensation for Lost Market Value Due
to Fear of Electric Transmission Lines, 12 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 711, 713 (1990); Philip
S. McCune, Note, The Power Line Health Controversy: Legal Problems and Proposals for
Reform, 24 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 429, 433-43 (1991); John Weiss, Note, The Power Line
Controversy: Legal Responses to Potential Electromagnetic Field Health Hazards, 15
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 359, 360 (1990).
17. See Criscuola v. Power Authority of the State, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1993).
18. See K. Brown, supra note 14, at 332-36.
19. In a minority of jurisdictions, electricity is considered a "product," at least when
placed in the stream of commerce. See, e.g., Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal.
App. 3d 68, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that electricity delivered to homes and
businesses is a product, not a service); Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051,
1057 (Colo. 1987) (same); Carbone v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 482 A.2d 722, 723
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (same); Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d
736, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (same); Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 451 A.2d
976, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982) (same); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275
N.W.2d 641, 644 (Wis. 1979) (same); but see Louis L. Boyle, Comment, Electrifying So-
lution for the Shocking and Disparate Treatment of Electricity Within Product Liability
Law, 93 Dick. L. Rev. 851, 855 (1989) (discussing electricity as a service).
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infliction of emotional stress, and increased risk of injury.2" Plaintiffs in
property damage cases have relied on theories of nuisance, trespass, and
inverse condemnation to attempt to prove damages due to the presence
of EMFs from transmission lines near their property.21
In the first EMF personal injury case to proceed to trial, the jury de-
clined to hold the utility liable for failing to warn the plaintiffs about
possible health effects from EMFs and for maintaining a nuisance by op-
erating the line near the plaintiffs' home.22 In the second personal injury
suit to proceed to trial, the jury specifically addressed whether EMFs
from the utilities' transmission line caused the plaintiff's cancer, and it
returned a verdict that the line did not.23
D. Regulatory Compliance
State legislatures and public utility commissions have formed special
task forces to prepare reports addressing various issues concerning
EMFs.24 Typically, a task force or consultant is required to make spe-
cific recommendations to a legislative committee or utility commission
either about how to minimize exposure to EMFs or whether the legisla-
ture should take precautionary or regulatory measures, or to assess the
scientific literature on EMFs.25
20. See Complaint, Zuidema v. San Diego Gas and Elec. Co., No. 638222 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May, 1991); Complaint, Allen v. Alabama Power Co., CV-91-321 (Ala. Cir.
Ct. May, 1991); see also Pamela J. Laquidara, Note, Litigating Nonionizing Radiation
Injury Claims: Traditional Approaches to a Contemporary Problem, 10 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 965, 1011 (1983); K. Brown, supra note 14, at 332-33.
21. See Fantigrassi v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 88-23253 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb.
17, 1992); Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Original Petition, Stewart v. Central Power & Light
Co., No. 91-5031-c (Tex. Dis. Ct. June 8, 1993).
22. See Zuidema v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., No. 638222 (Calif. Super. Ct. Apr.
30, 1993).
23. See Jordan v. Georgia Power Co., No. 91-4103 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 24, 1994).
24. See e.g., California EMF Consensus Group, Issues and Recommendations/or In-
terim Response and Policy Addressing Power Frequency Electric and Magnetic Fields
(EMFs) (March 20, 1992) (submitted to Public Utilities Commission of the State of Cali-
fornia) [hereinafter "Calif. Report"]; Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, Health Effects of Ex-
posure to Powerline-Frequency Electric and Magnetic Fields (March 1992); Electric
Transmission Research Needs Task Force, Electric and Magnetic Field Reduction: Re-
search Needs (Jan. 15, 1992) (submitted to Washington State Legislature); Connecticut
Academy of Science & Engineering, Electromagnetic Field Health Effects (April 1, 1992)
(submitted for the Department of Health Services of the State of Connecticut); Interim
Report to the Connecticut Legislature by the Task Force Studying Electric and Magnetic
Fields (Feb. 1, 1992); Khizar Wasti, Virginia Department of Health, Monitoring of Ongo-
ing Research on the Health Effects of High Voltage Transmission Lines (March 24, 1993)
(submitted to Virginia General Assembly). Sometimes outside consultants are hired to
prepare a report on EMFs. See, e.g., Commonwealth Associates Inc., Cost Effectiveness
Analysis: Mitigation of Electromagnetic Fields (May 29, 1992) (prepared for State of
Rhode Island); Thomas N. Duening, Background Report on the Health Effects of Power
Frequency Electric & Magnetic Fields (April 19, 1990) (prepared for the Oregon Depart-
ment of Energy).
25. Another approach to studying the EMF issue is to revise the definition of "radia-
tion" in state statutes to include EMFs in order to bring EMFs within the scope of a
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E. Workers' Compensation
EMF issues also arise in workers' compensation cases.26 In the first
workers' compensation case involving workplace injuries allegedly result-
ing from EMF exposure to proceed to trial, the widow of an employee of
Seattle City Light filed for death benefits under the State of Washington's
industrial insurance statute.2 7 She alleged that her husband developed
acute lymphocytic leukemia, a very rare form of leukemia in adults, as a
result of his exposure to magnetic fields during his employment at Seattle
City Light.2" The Industrial Appeals judge held that "[a]lthough the epi-
demiological studies taken as a whole show that there is indeed an associ-
ation between electrical occupations and leukemia," this association
alone did not prove that her husband's cancer was proximately caused by
exposure to EMFs. 9
An issue that may arise in occupational personal injury lawsuits
against utilities is whether workers' compensation statutes provide the
exclusive remedy for personal injuries allegedly caused by EMF exposure
during the course of employment. Some states provide an "intentional
tort exception" to exclusive coverage of workers' compensation. 30 This
exception has been successfully applied in asbestos cases, where the em-
ployer intentionally withheld important health information from the
employee. 3'
F. Insurance Coverage
Although no cases are yet reported, potential insurance coverage issues
involving EMFs include whether an insurance policy applies to EMF
claims and, if so, whether a pollution clause nevertheless bars coverage.
A typical comprehensive general liability insurance policy requires the
insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of a bodily injury or
property damage ... caused by an occurrence."' 32 These policies, how-
ever, typically exclude:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, disper-
particular agency's responsibility. See James N. Hyde, Jr., Tufts University, Health Ef-
fects of Extremely Low Frequency Electromagnetic Fields 18 (1991).
26. For a general discussion of how workers' compensation may apply to EMF injury
claims, see Pamela J. Laquidara, Litigating Nonionizing Radiation Injury Claims: Tradi-
tional Approaches to a Contemporary Problem, 10 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 965, 988-93
(1983).
27. See In re Pilisuk, No. 92-2051 (Wash. Bd. Indus. App. Apr. 19, 1994) (proposed
decision and order).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 35-36.
30. See 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation § 75 (1992).
31. See Rodgers v. Prudential Ins. Co., 803 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (M.D. Pa. 1992);
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
32. Insurance Services Offices, Inc., Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Form Policy (1973).
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sal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contami-
nants, pollutants into or upon the land, the atmosphere, or any water-
course or body of water, [unless the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is] sudden and accidental.33
Thus, like other coverage issues involving environmental damages, po-
tential litigation issues include whether the alleged EMF injury was
caused by an "occurrence," and whether the alleged EMF harm, such as
negligent infliction of emotional distress, increased risks of contracting a
disease, or "cancerphobia," constitute "bodily injury."' Other issues
might include whether severance damages constitute "property dam-
age,"' 31 or whether costs of complying with a commission's order to im-
plement prudent-avoidance measures or an injunction to reroute or bury
a transmission line constitute "property damages." Finally, another po-
tential litigation issue between utilities and their insurers is whether EMF
damages fall within the "pollution exclusion" clause, and if so, whether
they are "sudden and accidental" and nevertheless covered by the insur-
ance policy. 36
II. REGULATORY AND UTILITY RESPONSES TO EMF ISSUES
A. Regulatory Responses
Regulatory responses to the uncertainties of EMF health effects in the
above legal contexts range from taking no action to issuing EMF stan-
dards. Several utility commissions and legislatures have implemented
"prudent-avoidance" policies, which require utilities to reduce magnetic
field levels or to take other EMF mitigation action but only if the cost is
reasonable. Other commissions have required utilities, as a condition of
granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity, to minimize or
monitor EMFs. Finally, several states have promulgated EMF standards
that apply to the construction of new transmission lines.
1. Prudent Avoidance
An increasingly common regulatory response is to require utilities to
adopt a policy of "prudent avoidance" of EMFs when siting and design-
ing transmission lines and associated facilities.37 In a review of the scien-
33. Id,
34. See Covering the Fields. Accessing the Historical General Liability Insurance Cov-
erage for Electromagnetic Energy-Related Claims, Mealy's Litig. Rep., Oct. 7, 1993, at
12, 15-16.
35. See id. at 17; Alan S. Rutkin, Electromagnetic Fields: Nen-Wave Coverage Issues,
Best's Review, at 62, 98.
36. See Eugene R Anderson & Charles A. Stewart III, Insurance Coverage for EMF
Litigation: Yesterday's Policies Cover New Wave Problems, EMF Litig. Rep., Aug. 1993,
at 14, 20.
37. See Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc. 151 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 30, 43 (Ha.
P.U.C. 1994) (adopting EPA's explanation of prudent avoidance); infra notes 42-66.
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tific evidence in the EMF health effects literature, the Office of
Technology Assessment of the United States Congress ("OTA") defined
"prudent avoidance" 38 as a policy that "look[s] systematically for strate-
gies which can keep people out of 60 Hz fields arising from all sources
but only adopt[s] those which look to be 'prudent' investments given
their cost and our current level of scientific understanding about possible
risks."3 9 Thus, "avoidance" means implementing measures that mini-
mize exposure to 60-Hz fields, and "prudent" means implementing only
those avoidance measures that are cost effective. Prudent-avoidance poli-
cies have not been applied to existing transmission lines, except for up-
grades or rebuilds. Rather, regulators limit prudent-avoidance policies
to the construction of new transmission lines.40 Prudent avoidance is an
imprecise and evolving policy, and it can be expected to change to reflect
future medical and technological research, as well as the needs of those
promoting its use.4"
In 1989, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") was one
of the first utility commissions to require a utility to implement prudent
avoidance.42 In 1992, the CPUC codified this policy decision in Rule
18(i) of its Electric Service rules:
The utility shall include the concept of prudent avoidance with respect
to planning, siting, construction, and operation of transmission facili-
ties. Prudent avoidance shall mean the striking of a reasonable balance
between the potential health effects of exposure to magnetic fields and
the cost and impacts of mitigation of such exposure, busy [sic] taking
steps to reduce the exposure at reasonable or modest cost. Such steps
might include, but are not limited to: (1) Design alternatives consider-
ing the spatial arrangement of phasing of conductors; (2) Routing lines
to limit exposures to areas of concentrated population and group facili-
ties such as schools and hospitals; (3) Installing higher structures; (4)
Widening right of way corridors; and (5) Burial of lines.43
Although the term "prudent avoidance" is not always used to describe
EMF policies that reduce EMFs at reasonable cost, commissions are in
38. Prudent avoidance is also referred to as "field management."
39. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 77.
40. See Re Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 115 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 542
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1990).
41. See Calif. Report, supra note 24, at 54 (in noting that the term has been broad-
ened by some, the Consensus Group quoted the originator of the term: "'The lesson is
clear, 'prudence' is a relative concept. It depends upon the level of a decision maker's
concern, their values, and resources.' ").
42. See In re Public Service Co. of Colo., No. 89A-028E (Colo. P.U.C. Dec. 20,
1989). The CPUC defined "prudent avoidance" as "the striking of a reasonable balance
between avoiding potential harm and the attendant costs and risks." Id. at 17. The
CPUC ordered the utility to configure the lines in reverse phase, string the lines on single
steel poles instead of lattice towers, and maximize the distance of the poles from inhab-
ited properties, steps the CPUC believed would reduce exposure at reasonable cost. Id. at
19, 21.
43. Re Electric & Magnetic Fields, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 249, 250 (Colo.
P.U.C. 1992). The CPUC stated that it specifically endorses the:
1712 [Vol. 62
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fact adopting such policies. For example, in 1989, the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission ("WPSC") had investigated EMF issues and con-
cluded that the research did not establish that EMFs associated with
transmission lines pose a significant health risk to the public and conse-
quently, overall design and construction changes were not warranted."
Nevertheless, the WPSC directed utilities to "evaluate" alternative line
configurations and "explore" design changes whenever they proposed to
upgrade a line or build a new line. 5 In 1992, the WPSC reviewed the
additional research that had been conducted since the last proceeding,
and once again it concluded that EMFs associated with transmission
lines did not pose a significant health risk to the public.4 The WPSC
now believed, however, that the potential risk, although uncertain, was
great enough to warrant additional proactive responses.4 Therefore, the
WPSC now requires utilities, when planning transmission-line projects,
to take into consideration the number of people who could be exposed to
EMFs from the line and the intensity and duration of exposure. The
WPSC requires utilities to form a working group to develop a uniform
measurement protocol to measure EMFs for customers, prepare annual
reports demonstrating compliance with the order, and incorporate a re-
source option's ability to reduce EMFs when evaluating their costs and
benefits as part of the utilities' integrated resource planning process. 48
Design changes are still not mandatory, however; rather, utilities
"should" utilize a low-EMF design for a proposed line, and they "may"
choose the design from the best available control technologies. 9
In adopting amendments to its regulations of utilities proposing to
concept of relative or comparative risk.... Fundamental to this concept are the
following points:
- Society should allocate its scarce resources toward problems that pose the
highest risk.
- Risks can best be compared on an integrated basis, including across juris-
dictional lines, to prevent the expenditure of limited resources by one jurisdic-
tional agency on a modest potential harm, when that will prevent the
expenditure of funds on a more serious problem with more certainty of preven-
tion.
- The Commission intends to be mindful of its responsibility to consider the
costs and benefits of its rules on an integrated, societal basis.
Id
44. See Re Advance Plans for Constr. of Facilities, 102 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
245, 269 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
45. Id at 269-70. The WPSC also required the utilities to provide the public with
information, review research and "participate" through funding in design alternatives
that would reduce exposure to EMFs, and create a database on EMFs from facilities. See
id at 270.
46. See Re Advance Plans for Constr. of Facilities, 132 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
193, 194 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992).
47. Utilities are still required to comply with the 1989 order. See, e.g., Re Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-CE-178, 1993 WL 176063, at *7 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Jan. 7, 1993) (requiring facility to provide measurements of magnetic fields to continue
research on EMF-health effects).
48. See Advance Plans, 132 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 197-198.
49. See id at 197.
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build transmission lines, the Ohio Power Siting Board concluded that
"[u]ntil such time that [EMF] studies are more conclusive, the Board
believes that electric transmission facilities should be designed and sited
using methods which prudently address EMF issues.""0 The Ohio Power
Siting Board amended its regulations to require utilities to: estimate
EMF levels beneath power lines and along the rights-of-way; detail the
utility's consideration of EMFs, both "as a general company policy and
[specifically] in the design and siting" of the line; discuss the utility's
procedures for addressing public inquiries about EMFs; and estimate
population density adjacent to rights-of-way. 51
Similarly, the District of Columbia Public Service Commission has
proposed to amend its regulations concerning the construction of electric
plants to require utilities to evaluate EMFs in their environmental impact
statements.52 Specifically, utilities are required to submit information on:
EMF research; whether the proposed action will increase or decrease
EMFs and any mitigating measures; and the utility's efforts to measure
EMFs in affected communities.53 The utility must also demonstrate
compliance with all laws regulating EMFs, "if and when enacted."5"
The Public Utility Commission of Texas ("TX PUC") issued a report
in March, 1992 on the health effects of EMFs5" and recommended that:
(1) the TX PUC not set EMF standards or guidelines; (2) the TX PUC
not expand existing routing criteria to include EMF concerns; and (3)
the State of Texas not develop a specific research program at this time. 6
The Report recommended that the Texas Department of Health assume
a leadership role in sponsoring public informational meetings and that
the utilities and the Department of Health be responsive to the public's
need for EMF information.57 In recommending against including EMF
concerns in routing considerations, the TX PUC noted that a policy of
prudent avoidance had been the defacto policy in TX PUC criteria since
1976.58 Rather than promulgating regulatory criteria, the TX PUC
chose to continue its policy of de facto prudent avoidance in the siting of
transmission lines.59
Task-force recommendations can influence utility commissions' deci-
50. Re Electric & Magnetic Fields Emitted from High-voltage Transmission Lines,
141 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 290, 291 (Ohio Power Siting Bd. 1993) (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. See Re Procedures to Implement D.C. Code Section 43-1002, No. 873, 1993 WL
561404, at *1 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 3, 1993).
53. See id. at *8.
54. Id.
55. See Texas Pub. Util. Comm'n, Health Effects of Exposure to Powerline-Frequency
Electric and Magnetic Fields (1992).
56. See id. at xxi-xxii.
57. See id. at xxii.
58. See id. at xxi.
59. See id. The TX PUC has, in fact, continued its policy of prudent avoidance. See
Re Central Power & Light Co., 144 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 528, 528 (Tex. P.U.C.
1993).
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sions to adopt prudent-avoidance policies. For example, a California
EMF Consensus Group issued a report on March 20, 1992, recom-
mending that the California Public Utilities Commission ("CA PUC")
take interim actions until the scientific evidence warrants a different reg-
ulatory response.6° The Report recommended that the CA PUC: (1) au-
thorize utilities to conduct further EMT research and hold hearings to
determine appropriate expenditures for the research; 61 (2) implement a
coordinated EMF Education Plan for electric utility personnel, custom-
ers, and others;62 (3) adopt an interim policy authorizing utilities to im-
plement "no cost" or "low cost" steps to reduce fields,63 take public
concern into account when siting new facilities and authorize utilities to
make EMF measurements at customers' residences; and (4) convene pub-
lic participation hearings to implement these recommendations." The
CA PUC subsequently adopted a de facto prudent-avoidance policy 65
that applied to new transmission lines and defined "low cost" EMF miti-
gation measures to mean four percent or less of a specific project's budg-
eted costs. 66
60. The Consensus Group was part of an ongoing investigation of the health effects of
EMFs, see Re Potential Health Effects of Elec. & Magnetic Fields of Util. Facilities, 119
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th I (Cal. P.U.C. 1991), and was created to develop interim
policies dealing with EMF health concerns for the CA PUC to adopt. See Re Potential
Health Effects of Elec. & Magnetic Fields of Util. Facilities, No. 91-10-016, 1991 WL
496687, at *1 (Cal. P.U.C. Oct. 11, 1991) (endorsing creation of the Consensus Group).
61. California EMF Consensus Group, Issues and Recommendations for Interim Re-
sponse and Policy Addressing Power Frequency Electric and Magnetic Fields (EMFs) 2-5
(Mar. 20, 1992).
62. See id. at 5-8.
63. See id. at 8. The Consensus Group was unable to reach a consensus on the defini-
tion of "low cost," and other issues, including whether the CA PUC should prescribe a
policy of prudent avoidance for the public. The Consensus Group therefore recom-
mended that whether to exercise prudent avoidance should be left to the individual to
decide:
In the absence of specific knowledge of health impacts from EMFs, or which
characteristics of EMFs might be of concern, individuals should make their
own decisions for action, including "prudent avoidance." People may elect to
avoid unnecessary EMF exposure according to their individual values, beliefs,
and resources.
Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
64. See id. at 11-13.
65. The CA PUC, however, had already applied principles of prudent avoidance in
recent decisions. For example, in one proceeding the CA PUC required the applicant to
provide information to those in proximity to the transmission line, to measure EMF
levels, and to "minimize any increase in field exposure levels." Re Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 37 Cal. P.U.C.2d 413 (Sept. 12, 1990).
66. See Re Potential Health Effects of Elec. & Magnetic Fields of Util. Facilities, 147
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 361, 366-67 (Cal. P.U.C. 1993) (order instituting investigation
to develop policies and procedures for addressing potential health effects of EMFs of
utility facilities). The CA PUC stated that "low cost" EMF mitigation measures should
be utilized only if they would significantly reduce EMFs. Although some utilities pro-
posed a definition of "significant reduction" in EMFs as a 15 or 20% reduction, the CA
PUC declined to quantify "significant reduction." Id.
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2. Maintaining the Status Quo
Another regulatory response is to refrain from requiring utilities to
take any action with respect to EMFs. In every certification proceeding
in which an opponent of a line contends that EMFs from the proposed
line may adversely affect the health and safety of nearby residents, the
commission involved has found that the evidence fails to support such
assertions. 67 For example, in Re St. Joseph Light & Power Co.,68 inter-
venors, many of whom were farmers, opposed the siting and design of a
proposed transmission line, claiming that EMFs generated by the line
would be harmful to their "families, livestock, and livelihoods. ' 69 The
Missouri Commission stated that the intervenors failed to present any
evidence that EMFs were a health hazard.7" "Failing the presentation of
such evidence, the Commission cannot order Applicants . . . to adopt
preventative or palliative measures to combat a phenomena which, on
the basis of the information now before the Commission, may be rela-
tively benign."'"
In certification proceedings, some commissions have avoided the EMF
health-hazard issue altogether by deferring consideration of the issue to
an upcoming or current generic-investigation docket,72 while at least one
commission has avoided the issue in a generic investigation by deferring
consideration of the issue to an individual certification proceeding.73
These decisions may illustrate that commissions are reluctant to regulate
67. See, e.g., Re Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. A-110550FO55, 1993 WL 383052, at *3
(Pa. P.U.C. 1993) (stating that the evidence fails to show a connection between EMFs
and health problems); Re Nantahala Power & Light Co., 141 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
302, 310-11 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1993) (concluding that studies were inconsistent and
inconclusive regarding any correlation between health problems and EMFs); Re Consum-
ers Power Co., 140 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 332, 358 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993)
(holding that the line did not pose a health or safety hazard); Re Ettelson, No. 93-0162-
E-P, 1993 WL 263357, at *1 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 23, 1993) (stating that
there is insufficient evidence "to justify an absolute moratorium in the construction of
new lines"); In re Midwest Power, Nos. E-21043, E-21044, E-21045, 1993 WL 231592, at
*9 (Iowa Utils. Bd. Mar. 9, 1993) (stating that "the consensus of informed observers is
that there is no proof electric or magnetic fields (EMF) create an identifiable health
risk"); Re Pinckney Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 183,41 1-U, 1993 WL 217285, at *9 (Kan.
St. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1993) (refusing to issue an order that would assume a cause
and effect relationship between EMFs and risks to health without relevant information);
Re Emergency Petition of Non-Noticed Property Owners, No. A- 110550F055, 1991 WL
476313 (Pa. P.U.C. Mar. 8, 1991) (Commission refused to reopen proceedings or stay the
proceedings "for the sole purpose of investigating EMF, which was presently an un-
resolvable issue").
68. No. EA 90-252 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 1991) (report and order).
69. Id. at 5.
70. The Commission noted, however, that it could not conclude that EMFs are safe.
See id. at 13.
71. Id.; see also Re Union Elec. Co., No. EA-91-56, 1991 WL 441890, at *3 (Mo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 13, 1991) (finding no evidence that EMFs are harmful).
72. See Re Pinckney Neighborhood Ass'n, No. 183,411-U, 1993 WL 217285, at *5
(Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1993) (proceeding initiated by a complaint against utility
proposing to upgrade transmission line in complainant's neighborhood).
73. See Re Ettelson, No. 93-0162-E-P, 1993 WL 263357, at *1 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
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or address uncertain health risks. For example, in Re Pinckney Neigh-
borhood Association,74 the Commission refused to consider the health ef-
fects of EMFs and, instead, would only consider EMFs as a factor, along
with costs, in determining the proposed route's reasonableness.7" The
Commission concluded that "to issue binding and perhaps precedential
orders which assume a cause and effect relationship between EMF and
risks to health without all the relevant information would be counter-
productive and irresponsible. 76
3. Conditional Approval of Certification
In the context of proceedings to construct and operate a transmission
line, another typical regulatory response is to condition approval of certi-
fication upon the utility taking certain actions with respect to EMFs, de-
spite the lack of evidence to support a finding that EMFs are dangerous.
These actions include monitoring or conducting research on EMF health
effects, providing more information to the public and the commission, or
monitoring EMF levels around the utilities' transmission lines or in cus-
tomers' homes.
In Re Massachusetts Electric Co.,77 although the evidence did not
demonstrate that the proposed transmission line would adversely affect
residents' health, the Siting Council nevertheless attached a condition to
Comm'n Apr. 23, 1993) (involving petition for Commission to initiate a rulemaking to
consider issuing EMF limits for existing powerlines and a moratorium on new lines).
74. No. 183,411-U, 1993 WL 217285 (Kan. St. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1, 1993).
75. See iad at *5-6.
76. Id at *9. Another legal context in which a decision is made to take no action
includes commission responses to recommendations from legislatively created task forces.
The most common way for a legislature to address the uncertainty of harm from EMFs is
to set up a task force or form a legislative committee to study the issue and make recom-
mendations to the legislature. For example, Connecticut legislation created an inter-
agency task force to determine the state's appropriate role in addressing EMF issues. In
its Interim Report, the Task Force recommended that an active campaign of prudent
avoidance was not appropriate until it is better understood whether an EMF hazard ex-
ists. See Report To The Connecticut Legislature By The Task Force Studying Electric And
Magnetic Fields, Interim Report (Feb. 1, 1992). The Task Force also recommended that
EMF standards would be premature and that research developments should be followed
instead. See id. Similarly, in its eighth annual report on ongoing EMF research, the
Virginia Department of Health concluded:
Inconsistent and contradictory results in the currently available scientific litera-
ture, as well as the constraints of epidemiologic studies, are the reasons that
most scientific advisory groups, regulatory bodies, and legislators have been un-
able to set rational and tenable limits on EMF. Establishment of a health-based
standard or guideline is further beset by the fact that high voltage transmission
lines are not the sole source of EMF. All electrical and electronic products used
in our daily life produce EMF. Exposure to these fields is, therefore, unavoida-
ble. Thus, deriving arbitrary numbers to use as an acceptable level of exposure
in the absence of scientific justification may in fact induce a false sense of
security.
Virginia Dep't of Health, Monitoring of Ongoing Research on the Health Effects of High
Voltage Transmission Lines, Eighth Annual Report, at 5 (Mar. 24, 1993).
77. No. 84-24A (Mass. Energy Facilities Siting Council Nov. 21, 1985).
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the approval to construct the line, which required the applicant to pre-
pare proposals to monitor EMFs where populations would be exposed. 78
Similarly, in Re Georgetown University,79 the Commission determined
that the applicant to construct and operate a cogeneration facility and
associated transmission line had adequately considered the environmen-
tal impact of the facility as required by law,80 but the Commission never-
theless required the applicant to provide additional information on
transmission line configuration and ordered the applicant to record mag-
netic fields in strategically located private homes to "perhaps allay some
of the public's concerns." '
Thus, although these commissions may feel restrained in requiring
utilities to implement design changes or reroute lines, or to take other
measures to "prudently avoid" human exposure to EMFs, they appar-
78. See id.; see also Re Boston Edison Co., No. D.P.U. 92-229, 1993 WL 344494, at
*8 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. May 11, 1993) (requiring utility to provide residents with
EMF measurements upon request).
79. 131 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 387 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1992).
80. Although the Commission found that the applicant did not adequately consider
EMF issues in the environmental impact statement, the Commission found that subse-
quent testimony on behalf of the applicant was sufficient. However, the Commission
expressed its displeasure with the applicant's failure to consider in detail the EMF issues
in the environmental impact statement because, in the Commission's view, addressing the
issues at an earlier stage might have alleviated some of the public's concern. See id. at
435-36. Thus, the Commission may have required the extra research because of the ap-
plicant's failure to consider the EMF issues at the appropriate time.
81. Id. at 437. In response to an application for the Commission to reconsider its
decision and require the applicant to conduct even more studies of the EMF impact of the
cogeneration facility, the Commission said:
[U]ntil the scientific community establishes a reasonable standard, there is no
benefit to be obtained from additional measurements of EMF. Moreover, the
Commission's decision to order further EMF studies does not impact upon the
approval of the cogeneration facility. Instead, the additional studies were re-
quired to provide the parties and the community with additional information
regarding EMF impact.
Re Georgetown Univ., 131 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 457, 461 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1992).
Nevertheless, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs suspended the pro-
ject indefinitely until the agency learns more about the health effects of EMFs. More-
over, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted emergency legislation that requires
public utilities to prepare an environmental impact statement for transmission lines over
69,000 volts. The Commission held that the legislation applied retroactively to the Ge-
orgetown applicant's proposed project and the applicant was required to perform an envi-
ronmental impact statement on the proposed transmission lines. See Re Georgetown
Univ., 147 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 495 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993). On Decem-
ber 23, 1993, the applicant filed a motion to terminate the proceedings due to the fact that
the project was no longer financially viable. See Re Georgetown Univ., No. 10366, 1994
WL 71674, at *2 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 14, 1994). The applicant complained
that the facility had been subjected to "unprecedented" and "plainly duplicative" pro-
ceedings by a number of agencies, and that the delays have prevented the applicant from
meeting the schedule required in its Power Purchase Agreement. Id. As a result, the
applicants have filed an $80 million law suit against the District of Columbia and six
government officials. See Georgetown Owners Suefor $80 Million Over 'Unlawful' EMF-
Related Permit Delays, Util. Envtl. Rep., Nov. 12, 1993, at 4.
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ently believe that public concern about the health effects of EMFs justi-
fies requiring utilities to at least gather and monitor information on EMF
health and safety impacts.
4. EMF Standards
Currently, seven states have adopted electric and/or magnetic field
limits that apply to the construction of electric transmission lines. 2
These states are Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, and Florida. 3 Electric field limits have been in exist-
ence for years, and it is only recently, with the promulgation of Florida's
standards and New York's interim standards, that states have issued lim-
its on magnetic fields.14
The New York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC") adopted an
interim standard on magnetic fields85 that applies to the edges of rights-
of-way of new electric transmission facilities.86 The NY PSC refused to
adopt a standard based on health effects and instead adopted a policy of
"prudent avoidance."87 This policy "support[s] an interim standard that
would avoid unnecessary increases in existing levels of exposure to mag-
netic fields. Such a standard thus would apply only to future transmis-
sion line facilities... and would not be intended to imply either 'safe' or
'unsafe' levels of exposure."88 In adopting the policy of prudent avoid-
ance, the NY PSC relied on the OTA Report and the results of a mag-
netic-field survey conducted by the major electric utilities in the state
under conditions specified by the NY PSC staff. 9 The report showed
that the average magnetic field at the edges of the rights-of-way for all
345 kV lines in the state was 200 mG, which is the standard the NY PSC
adopted.90 Thus, New York's standard is based on maintaining the sta-
tus quo,9" rather than on increasing safety.9 2
82. In addition, some international organizations and foreign countries have adopted
EMF standards. See Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., Health Effects of Exposure to Power-
line-Frequency Electric & Magnetic Fields, 6.3-6.4 (March 1992).
83. For an overview of each state's standards, see id. at 6.5-6.8.
84. See id at 6.6.
85. NY PSC adopted an electric field interim standard of 1.6 kilovolt per meter for
transmission facilities in 1978. See Health/Safety of Extra-High Voltage Lines, 18 N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n (1978) (cases 26529 and 26559).
86. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Proceeding on Motion of the Comm'n as to Regula-
tions Regarding Elec & Magnetic Field Standards for Transmission Lines (Sept. 11, 1990)
(cases 26529 and 26559) [hereinafter "NY Interim Policy"].
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id.
89. See NY Interim Policy, supra note 86, at 2-3. For a history and discussion of the
report and magnetic standards, see Sherry Young, Regulatory and Judicial Responses to
the Possibility of Biological Hazards from Electro-Magnetic Fields Generated By Power
Lines, 36 Viii. L. Rev. 129, 171-178 (1991).
90. This was upheld on appeal in Atwell v. Power Authority, 415 N.Y.S.2d 476, 482
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
91. This was the Commission's approach in adopting a standard for electric fields in
1978. Although the Commission conceded that the record in that proceeding did not
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B. Utility Responses
Increasingly, utilities are adopting prudent-avoidance measures at the
design stage, even if there is no legal obligation to do so. 93 Two utilities
have even adopted self-imposed EMF standards,94 and others have
designed their lines to conform with the most stringent existing EMF
standards. 95 At least one utility planned to put its proposed transmission
line underground to reduce EMF exposure,96 and another abandoned its
plans to construct new lines after customers raised concerns about
EMFs. 97 On the other hand, many of the EMF-reducing designs used by
utilities could have been implemented initially with purposes other than
reducing EMFs, such as avoiding delays and opposition to siting a line,
or the choice of a particular design coincidentally may have had lower
magnetic fields than other likely alternatives.98 In these cases, although
the designs were not chosen with intentions to "prudently avoid" EMF
risks, the implementation of a particular design could be interpreted as a
prudent-avoidance measure. These cases could affect a commission's de-
cision on rate recovery: if commissions deny recovery for prudent-avoid-
ance measures because the investments were imprudent given the lack of
evidence that EMFs are harmful, then a utility's intentions in implement-
ing an EMF-reducing design may become crucial.
Demonstrating that the design and construction of transmission lines
are consistent with prudent avoidance is important in certificate proceed-
ings as well. Commission decisions will often take into account a utility's
efforts to reduce EMFs, even though insufficient evidence was presented
show that EMFs were harmful, the record did contain enough "unrefuted inferences" of
possible risk to prompt the Commission to declare a "moratorium" on electric fields
higher than those of lines currently operating throughout the state. See Health/Safety of
Extra-High Voltage Lines, 18 N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 665, 690 (1978).
92. Cf M. Granger Morgan et al., Controlling Exposure to Transmission Line Electro.
magnetic Fields: A Regulatory Approach that Is Compatible with the Available Science,
Pub. Util. Fort., March 17, 1988, at 49-50, 52 (discussing safety issues generally).
93. See Re Consumers Power Co., 140 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 332 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1993); In re Nantahala Power & Light Co., 141 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
302, 311 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1993); Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., No. PUE890057,
1991 WL 517164, at *4 (Va. St. Corp. Comm'n June 13, 1991) (noting that construction
of substation would actually reduce existing fields because of a cancelation effect).
94. See Re Delmarva Power & Light Co., No. 8430, 1993 WL 595658, at *11-12 (Md.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 5, 1993).
95. See Re Iowa Southern Utilities Co., Nos. E-21013, E-21014, 1993 WL 116715, at
*7 (Iowa Utils. Bd. March 4, 1993) (noting establishment of "the most restrictive of any
existing standards of EMF").
96. Pennsylvania P&L To Underground 2. 75-Mile Line To Cut Back on EMF, Util.
Envtl. Rep., Feb. 5, 1993, at 13.
97. See PSI Energy, Nipsco Abandon Power Lines After Customers Express EMF Con-
cerns, Util. Envtl. Rep., Feb. 18, 1994, at 10.
98. In a survey of electric utilities nationwide, at least one utility reported this as the
reason for placing a transmission line underground. See Undergrounding Pol'y Advisory
Committee, Electric Undergrounding Policy Recommendation Report, at App. D (July 27,
1993) (prepared for the Colorado Springs City Council).
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to demonstrate that EMFs are harmful. 99 In Re Potomac Electric Power
Co., ° for example, the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Md.
PSC") considered the "extra measures" that the utility undertook to re-
duce EMFs "consistent with the theory of 'prudent avoidance,'" and it
refused to require the utility to make additional design or operation
changes. It is unclear, however, whether the Commission would have
imposed prudent-avoidance measures if the utility had not already imple-
mented them. Nevertheless, decisions like this one encourage utilities to
implement prudent-avoidance measures.
III. RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF EMF-RELATED COSTS
Utilities face uncertainty in the ratemaking treatment of EMF-related
costs in part because it is not known whether EMFs are harmful, and in
part because regulators inconsistently apply prudence reviews to utility
expenditures. Utilities that implement prudent-avoidance measures to-
day, when there is no scientific basis to conclude that EMFs cause ad-
verse health effects, risk the disallowance of costs associated with those
measures. Even if a regulatory agency allows a utility to recover current
expenses of prudent-avoidance measures, if EMFs are later determined to
be benign, a commission may deny the capital investments in design tech-
nologies or wider rights-of-way from inclusion in rate base because such
investments may be determined no longer "used and useful." In con-
trast, if a utility does not implement prudent-avoidance measures today,
but EMFs are later determined to be harmful, a commission may deny
recovery of expenses incurred as a result of that delay if the utility was
imprudent in not implementing prudent-avoidance measures earlier.
Thus, the EMF issue has created a serious dilemma for commissions and
utilities. In meeting their duty to provide safe and reliable service by
implementing prudent-avoidance measures, as insurance against the pos-
sibility that EMFs may be harmful, utilities risk disallowance of those
costs and potential impairment of their opportunity to earn a reasonable
return on their investments. Commissions, on the other hand, must ask
themselves whether they are acting responsibly if they allow utilities to
recover EMF mitigation costs when there is no scientific basis to con-
clude that EMFs cause adverse health effects, and whether, if they deny
recovery, they are penalizing utilities for implementing precautionary
safety measures.
A. The Ratemaking Process and Cost Recovery
Commissions are responsible for balancing the competing interests of
utility investors, ratepayers, and the general public. Utility commissions
regulate the rates utilities charge for electric service to prevent the utility
99. See In re Midwest Power, Nos. E-21043, E-21044, E-21045, 1993 WL 231592, at
*9 (Iowa Utils. Bd. Mar. 9, 1993).
100. No. 7004, 1990 Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n LEXIS 59 (May 1, 1990).
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from charging monopolistic prices and to ensure that utilities charge cus-
tomers just and reasonable rates. In fairness to utility investors, how-
ever, these rates must also permit investors in stocks and bonds the
opportunity to earn a reasonable return on their investments. Commis-
sions are also responsible for protecting the public from unsafe electric
service.
The ratemaking process is a long and complicated one, primarily be-
cause it involves the setting of rates prospectively. To set these rates,
utility commissions generally select a representative test year to provide
an approximation of the utilities' future gross revenues and expenses.
Commissions use a deceptively simple formula to determine the rates
utilities need to charge in order to continue business (i.e., the "revenue
requirement"). One way to state this formula is R = 0 + B(r), where R
is the allowed revenue requirement, 0 is the utility's operating costs, B is
the utility's rate base, and r is the utility's rate of return allowed on its
rate base. 0 1 The "rate design" phase follows, in which the utility com-
mission establishes the actual rates that utilities will charge various
classes of customers. 10 2
Operating expenses usually include operation and maintenance ex-
penses, depreciation and amortization, taxes, fuel, and wages."0 3 Com-
missions review operating expenses because utilities pass these expenses
directly on to ratepayers. Moreover, if a utility inflates its operating ex-
penses, which would appear to reduce the utility's profits, the utility
could seek a higher rate increase. The fact that a commission disallows
an operating expense does not mean that a utility cannot incur the ex-
pense. It means only that the utility's investors must bear the cost,
rather than the ratepayers. If a commission approves an operating ex-
pense, then the utility recovers the expense from ratepayers through its
electric rates.
Rate base is the total value of the utility's investment and the capital it
uses to provide service."° Some items included in rate base are plant-in-
service, construction-work-in-progress (CWIP), plant held for future use,
and working capital. Plant-in-service includes investments in transmis-
sion lines and rights-of-way. In the EMF context, commissions probably
would consider investments in design technologies, wider rights-of-way,
and more expensive alternative routes to be capital investments that
could be included in rate base. Utilities are allowed to earn a rate of
return on the capital investments included in rate base, in contrast to
operating expenses, which are not permitted a rate of return.
101. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., et. al., Economic Regulation: Energy, Transportation
and Utilities 130 (1980).
102. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 259-60.
103. See 3 David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, Energy Law & Transactions 80-
(1993).
104. See A.J.G. Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation: Theory and Applica
tion 139 (1969).
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Commissions use two standards to determine whether utilities should
recover costs in rates. Commissions use these standards to act as substi-
tutes for market signals that exist in unregulated markets, not as substi-
tutes for management decision-making.' First, under the "used and
useful" standard, any property that a utility proposes to include in its
rate base must be actually in use, or in use within a reasonable period of
time, and providing service to customers.10 6 Second, under the prudent-
investment test, regulators may disallow investments, either in whole or
in part, only if the investments are excessive or were imprudently in-
curred based on information reasonably available at the time the invest-
ment was made, regardless of whether the regulators deem the facilities
to be used and useful in hindsight. 07 Historically, regulators had been
reluctant to scrutinize expenses unless there was an "abuse of discre-
tion," because regulators are "not empowered to substitute [their] judg-
ment for that of the directors of the corporation."'10 8
Regulators' historical reluctance to disallow expenses subsided, how-
ever, when utilities confronted commissions with requests for large rate
increases, such as those to recover investments in nuclear energy
projects" 9 and more recently, expensive water treatment plants needed
to comply with federal mandates under the Safe Drinking Water Act."o
In the 1970s, utility management in hindsight incorrectly forecasted the
nation's future energy needs and heavily invested in the construction of
nuclear power plants."1' Many of these nuclear plant projects have been
canceled, or many plants that were completed now have substantial ex-
cess capacity."' In addition, other utilities that built plants experienced
significant cost overruns. Although regulators typically analyzed costs
associated with excess capacity and canceled plants under prudence or
used and useful standards, their decisions varied considerably among ju-
risdictions. For example, while many jurisdictions included the excess
105. See Robert L. Swartwout, Current Utility Regulatory Practice from a Historical
Perspective, 32 Nat. Res. J. 289, 308-09 (1992).
106. See Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge From the Power
Plant?, 34 Hastings L.J. 1133, 1149 (1983).
107. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989).
108. Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
289 (1923) (quoting with approval State Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Springfield Gas & Elec.
Co., 291 IM. 209, 234 (1919)).
109. See Paul L. Gioia, The Prudence Standard: Recent Experience and Future Rele-
vance, Pub. Util. Fort., April 27, 1989, at 11; Charles M. Studness, The Regulatory Com-
pact that Never Was, Pub. Util. Fort., Sept. 1, 1991, at 34, 35; Robert L. Swartwout,
Current Utility Regulatory Practice from a Historical Perspective, 32 Nat. Res. J. 289, 326
(1992) (noting that a "shift in the burden of proof from the regulatory staff and interven-
ors to the utility" represented a "critical departure from traditional regulatory practice").
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
111. See Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and
Application, 20 Tulsa L.J. 402, 402-03 (1985).
112. See, e.g., id at 404-06 (discussing Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Company's excess
capacity).
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capacity in rate base after applying the used and useful test,1H3 other ju-
risdictions denied utilities permission to include portions of nuclear
plants representing excess capacity or an abandoned plant in rate base
because the excess capacity or the abandoned plant neither provided nec-
essary service nor generated any benefit to ratepayers."14
Some commissions that applied the prudent-investment test excluded
investment in excess capacity in rate base because "a prudent utility plan-
ner would have realized that no plant was necessary" at the time the
utility made the decision to construct the plant." 5 Other commissions
denied permission to include investment in excess capacity in rate base
because the utility management, although initially prudent, imprudently
failed to stop constructing new plants after information about the plants'
economic infeasibility subsequently became available. 1 6 Commissions
also have disallowed recovery of the costs of canceled nuclear projects
and construction-cost overruns that they found to be imprudent. 117
For many regulators, the disallowances may have been the only politi-
cally palatable regulatory response to the dilemma of either permitting
huge rate increases with no equivalent return to the ratepayer, or requir-
ing utility shareholders to assume enormous costs that could jeopardize
the utility's continued existence." 8 Since its application in the unusual
and politically charged nuclear plant cases, the prudent-investment stan-
dard has become controversial, and the utility industry is becoming in-
creasingly uncertain about how commissions will evaluate investments
under prudence review.
B. EMF-Related Costs
One authority estimates that the electric-utility industry spends more
113. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 514 (1984).
114. See Colton, supra note 111, at 416-21.
115. Id. at 423.
116. See id. at 424-25.
117. See John A. Anderson, Are Prudence Reviews Necessary?, Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 1,
1991, at 24 (documenting $10 billion of nuclear power plant prudence disallowances).
118. The regulatory extremes of complete inclusion and complete exclusion in rate
base have been criticized as creating improper incentives for the utility industry to over-
invest or underinvest in nuclear power. See Pierce, supra note 113, at 540. Although this
may be present to some extent in the EMF context, the incentive to overinvest may not be
as great because the critical decision affecting the implementation of prudent avoidance is
not so much whether to build new capacity, but how and where to build. Moreover, the
regulatory treatment of excess and abandoned nuclear plants arguably has created an
incentive for the utility industry not to invest in new capacity. See Charles M. Studness,
The Failure of Utility Regulation and the Case for Deregulation, Pub. Util. Fort., Sept. 15,
1991, at 26. Of more concern in the EMF cases, however, are incorrect signals of a
different kind: the complete inclusion might encourage inefficient or unnecessary mitiga-
tion measures, and the complete exclusion might discourage socially desirable actions,
such as prudent health and safety protective measures.
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than one billion dollars on EMF-related expenses a year." 9 Utilities con-
tinue to incur significant expenses related to EMFs, and these expenses
eventually will be passed on to ratepayers or shareholders or both.1
20
Utilities incur two types of EMF costs: first, they incur costs siting and
constructing a line, such as transmission-line design changes to reduce
magnetic fields, alternative routes, and costs for purchases of wider
rights-of-way; second, they incur ancillary costs, such as severance dam-
ages due to EMF fears, litigation expenses to defend against property and
personal injury claims, regulatory compliance costs, and EMF research
costs. Generally, construction-related costs are capital costs, eligible for
inclusion into rate base and a reasonable rate of return thereon. Ancil-
lary costs generally are operating costs, and utilities can recover these
costs in the rates they charge ratepayers if the costs were prudently
incurred.
Magnetic fields from transmission lines can be reduced in several ways,
including: phase cancelation;' 21 reducing the current; increasing the
distance of people from the line;' 23 and placing the line underground. 1
24
Moreover, the design configurations available to build transmission lines
produce varying EMFs. One study estimated that the costs of designs for
above-ground lines with lower EMFs than the typical "base case"' 125 de-
sign can range from $220,000 to $500,000 per mile of line, compared to
the base case of between $230,000 and $260,000 per mile of line. 126 Simi-
larly, a cost-effectiveness analysis of low-EMF-design options for electric
utilities in the State of Rhode Island estimated construction costs for the
design options to range from $450,000 to $550,000 per mile for an above-
ground 345 kV line, as compared to $390,000 for existing H-Frame de-
signs.1 27 The report noted, however, that these costs represent costs for
material and installation only: "The utilities' total cost per mile would
119. See EMF Science Must Be Sound, Credible To Get Public Backing. Industry Say
[sic], Energy Rep., March 16, 1992, at 194.
120. See Philip S. McCune, The Power Line Health Controversy: Legal Problems and
Proposals for Reform, 24 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 429, 459 (1991) (stating that "delays and
cancellations of construction projects [due to EMF concerns] have cost consumers bil-
lions of dollars in lost opportunities for cheaper, more easily transported power").
121. "Phase cancelation" refers to the technique of arranging the flow of currents to
reduce the effects of another field of equal magnitude but opposite direction. See The
Electric Transmission Research Needs Task Force, Electric and Magnetic Field Reduc-
tion: Research Needs 20-21, 23 (Jan. 15, 1992) (report submitted to Washington State
Legislature).
122. See Commonwealth Assocs., Inc., Cost Effectiveness Analysis: Mitigation of Elec-
tromagnetic Fields 13, 15 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter "Cost-Effective EMF Mitigation"]
(report prepared for subcommittee of the Rhode Island State Legislature).
123. See id at 16.
124. See ia at 21.
125. The typical "base case design" is a "conventional flat, horizontal conductor ar-
rangement operated at 230 kilovolts (kV) with 300 amperes (amps) current for 125 mega-
watts (MW) of power; supported by wooden H-frame poles." The Electric Transmission
Research Needs Task Force, supra note 121, at 28.
126. See id at 26-27.
127. See Cost-Effective EMF Mitigation, supra note 122, at 15.
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be much higher [considering] engineering design, licensing, right-of-way
acquisitions and clearing, special structures or construction require-
ments, administration, interest costs, etc."'128 The greatest cost difference
is between above-ground and underground lines. The estimated con-
struction cost of a 345 kV underground transmission line is $1,450,000
per mile. 129  Another study estimated a range of $1,500,000 to
$2,000,000 per mile for a 230 kV underground line. 130
In the second category of costs are costs that are ancillary to the con-
struction of transmission lines. Severance damages represent the addi-
tional compensation to property owners for the decline in their
property's market value because of the proximity of transmission lines to
their property.1 3 1 Utilities are increasingly incurring litigation expenses
to defend against property and personal injury claims. 132 In fact, a New
York utility spent two million dollars on attorneys and expert witnesses
fees in defending against 140 landowners who claimed $117 million in
property devaluation due to "cancerphobia" associated with the lines.133
A number of utilities within jurisdictions that have adopted EMF
standards have incurred costs to comply with statutory or regulatory re-
quirements, such as wider rights-of-way, research, and design changes.
Likewise, utilities whose certificates impose EMF-related conditions have
incurred compliance expenses. The Energy Policy Act of 1992134 autho-
rizes $65 million over the next five years, half of which the private sector
will provide, for a research and public information program on the
health effects of EMFs.13 5 Almost every utility spends some money on
EMF research, both through membership in either electric trade organi-
zations, such as the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) or the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI), or as part of its own independent research.
C. Ratemaking Treatment of Current Costs in the Face of Uncertainty
Where states have legislatively established EMF standards or utility
commissions require utilities to implement prudent-avoidance measures,
128. Id. at 14.
129. See id. at 22.
130. See The Electric Transmission Research Needs Task Force, supra note 121, at 27;
see also U.S. Dep't of Energy, Electrical and Biological Effects of Transmission Lines: A
Review 83 (1989) (stating that underground lines cost 8-10 times more than comparable
overhead lines).
131. See Electromagnetic Fields: Criscuola v. New York Power Auth., Util. Indus. Litig.
Rep., March 15, 1994, at 8750 (reporting that plaintiffs in the Criscuola case settled with
the utility for $24,000).
132. See Public Interest Attorney Warns Utilities of More EMF Lawsuits, Elec. Util.
Wk., Sept. 16, 1991, at 3 (reporting that the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice warned
utilities to expect more litigation on EMFs).
133. See Pam Black, Rising Tension over High-Tension Lines, Bus. Wk., Oct. 30, 1989,
at 158, 160.
134. Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered
titles of U.S.C.).
135. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13478 (West Supp. 1994).
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the commissions should allow the utility to recover the prudently in-
curred costs associated with complying with those laws or regulations,
regardless of the state of evidence about EMF health effects. Commis-
sions should treat EMF-compliance costs in the same way they treat pol-
lution-control compliance costs and other health and safety compliance
costs.
For a long time, commissions have allowed utilities to recover, as oper-
ating expenses, pollution control costs and other regulatory compliance
costs. 136 With the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments
("CAAA"), which require utilities to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) and
nitrogen oxide (NO.) emissions, utility commissions will wrestle with re-
covery and allocation issues that are related to pollution-control compli-
ance costs on a much greater scale.' 37 Regulators generally have not
challenged recovery of prudently incurred CAAA compliance costs.' 3
The issues in recovery of CAAA compliance costs typically relate to the
manner of recovery.' 39 Several states have even enacted legislation to
allow for the preapproval of CAAA compliance plans, which are re-
quired under the CAAA." ° These states permit utilities to recover in-
vestments in pollution-control equipment and associated operating costs
that the CAAA requires. 41 Other states permit utilities to recover emis-
sions fees that are imposed by state law' 42 or to recover "prudently and
reasonably incurred costs of environmental controls." 4 3 Utilities should
be permitted to recover costs that they prudently spend to comply with
EMF standards or to comply with commission decisions that require the
utility to implement more costly technologies or other investments, be-
cause these are legitimate costs incurred in providing current service.
In requiring utilities to educate the public about EMFs from power
lines, the California Public Utilities Commission addressed the issue of
recovering these costs. One ratepayer interest group argued that the leg-
136. See, e.g., Virginia v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 89 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 3d
395, 405 (Va. Ct. App. 1971) (environmental protection expenditures); Re Iowa Power &
Light Co., 103 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 139, 153 (Iowa Utils. Bd. 1989) (PCB
cleanups).
137. Compare Ann F. Williams, Reducing Pollution: Who Pays the Bill?, Pub. Util.
Fort., Jan. 15, 1991, at 28, 28-30 (as of 1989, before the CAAA were passed, 36 commis-
sions reported they had not had rate cases involving pollution-control expenses) with
Mary Nagelhout, States Take Action on Clean Air Act Compliance, Pub. Util. Fort., Dec.
15, 1992, at 37 (describing the increased action by commissions and state legislatures
addressing CAAA compliance costs).
138. See James E. Norris, Clean Air Act Compliance: State Regulators Respond, Pub.
Util. Fort., Apr. 1, 1992, at 31.
139. See Re Mississippi Power Co., 135 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 8, 11 (Miss. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1992); Re Potomac Electric Power Co., 140 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 25,
170-72 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651g(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
141. See Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-27-12 (Burns 1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4909.192
(Anderson Supp. 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.183 (Baldwin 1993).
142. See Re Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4905.31(B)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
143. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 220, § 1-102(b)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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islature, not the utilities, should appropriate funds for this purpose, or
alternatively, that shareholders and unregulated utilities should share the
EMF-education costs with ratepayers. The Commission disagreed, citing
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., " the seminal case
in affirming that shareholders are entitled to an opportunity to earn a
reasonable return on their investments. The California Public Utilities
Commission said:
Prudent EMF costs associated with electric utility related work and
facilities are a part of a utility's cost to provide energy services in a safe
and efficient way. Absent substantive testimony ... and a change in
the regulatory policy of allowing utilities to recover reasonable costs
incurred in the performance of utility service, shareholder funding for
the EMF education program is not a viable alternative.145
Where utilities voluntarily implement prudent-avoidance measures,
however, utilities face greater uncertainty in the recovery of the costs of
those measures because these decisions involve considerably more utility
discretion. While health effects of EMFs remain uncertain, if a utility
voluntarily implements prudent avoidance or EMF mitigation, ratepay-
ers could challenge the utility's expenditure as unnecessary or imprudent
given the lack of evidence on EMF health effects, or they could argue
that EMF-related investments are unnecessary to the provision of ser-
vice, or fail to benefit ratepayers, at least for those not in proximity to a
line where EMFs are reduced. These costs are problematic to commis-
sions because, although these costs are not legally required for the provi-
sion of electric service, and the scientific evidence has not conclusively
demonstrated that EMFs are harmful, denying recovery of EMF-related
costs discourages arguably prudent safety measures and ignores the pub-
lic's and customers' increasing concerns about EMF health effects. 146
Past commission treatment of costs of voluntary investigations or
cleanups of manufactured-gas plant (MGP) sites could provide direction
to commissions confronted with challenges to a utility's recovery of EMF
costs.147 In the voluntary MGP cases, consumers have argued that they
144. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
145. Re Potential Health Effects of Elec. & Magnetic Fields of Util. Facilities, 147
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 361, 376 (Cal. P.U.C. 1993).
146. Although commissions will likely be conflicted about their role in situations
where public controversy, rather than scientific controversy, pressures them to act, both
commissions and utilities have a responsibility to respond in some manner to reasonable
public health and safety concerns, regardless of the lack of scientific basis to support
those concerns. This responsibility is derived in large part from the nature of businesses
"affected with a public interest." See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
147. Another example is commission treatment of voluntary contributions to the
cleanup of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. In the TMI cases, the utilities volunta-
rily contributed sums to Edison Electric Institute, a trade organization of the electric
utility industry, for the cleanup of the TMI nuclear-generating-station accident in Penn-
sylvania. The utilities argued that the costs were beneficial in adding to the knowledge of
the operation and eventual decommissioning of the company's nuclear units, or that the
contribution would "enhance the industry's knowledge of radioactive waste disposal,
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should not pay for cleanup costs or investigation costs related to MGP
sites that no government agency has ordered the utility to clean up. 4 '
At least one commission has rejected this argument, explaining that
"failure to remediate voluntarily could result in the issuance of [a govern-
mental order mandating cleanup], loss of control over the remediation
activities, and higher costs."' 49 In another decision, the commission
noted that no government authority required any of the utility's cleanup
programs. The commission said, however, "government inaction does
not necessarily mean that no environmental hazard exists."' 50 Due to
the uncertainty of the utility's liability, the commission authorized $2
million for investigations of hazardous waste sites, and it required the
utility to file for approval of funding for cleanup efforts, followed by re-
view of the costs in an Energy Cost Adjustment Clause proceeding. 5'
The commission further required the utility to give first priority to
mandatory cleanup and second priority to "sites which pose a significant
public health threat."'
52
These voluntary MGP cleanup cases are similar to EMF cases in that
failure to implement design changes now, before a line is constructed,
could mean significantly higher costs later if EMFs are found to be harm-
which will have long-term benefits for ratepayers." Re Western Mass. Elec. Co., 80 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 479, 561 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1986). Commissions generally
have rejected these arguments, explaining that the expenses are not research-related ex-
penses because the expenses would primarily benefit TMI owners. See id. at 562; Re
Ohio Edison Co., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 241, 267-68 (Ohio P.U.C. 1985); see also
Re Duke Power Co., 79 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 145, 174 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1986) ("While the Commission lauds Duke's efforts in participating in the TMI cleanup
and being a leader in the nuclear industry in doing so, the Commission finds that this
voluntary effort should be borne by the shareholders and not recovered through rates.").
The TMI cases differ, however, from the EMF cases where a utility voluntarily imple-
ments prudent-avoidance measures. In the TMI cases, the cleanup costs were contrib-
uted to property that the utility did not own, derive any benefit from, or use. The
property had no connection with the contributing utility, except that another investor-
owned utility owned the property. The primary recipient of the benefits of the contribu-
tion would be the other investor-owned utilities responsible for cleaning up the contami-
nated property. In EMF cases, prudent-avoidance measures will be spent on property
used in the service of electricity, residents near the lines will derive benefit in reduced
fields, or at least peace of mind, and ratepayers in general arguably derive a benefit be-
cause the utility is taking reasonable measures now to avoid the possibility of implement-
ing more costly mandatory measures later.
148. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 86-12-095, 1986 Cal. P.U.C. LEXIS 886, at 098
(Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 22, 1986); Re Central Ill. Light Co., 124 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
498, 502 (111. Commerce Comm'n 1991), rev'd on other grounds, Central Ill. Light Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 624 N.E.2d 819 (Ill. App. 1993) (remanding to the Commis-
sion for further proceedings in light of its recent conflicting decision in a generic coal tar
proceeding).
149. Re Central Ill. Light Co., 124 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 498, 504 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n 1991), rev'd on other grounds, Central Ill. Light Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 624 N.E.2d 819 (ill. App. 1993).
150. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., No. 86-12-095, 1986 Cal. PUC LEXIS 886, at '105.
151. See id. at *106.
152. Id. at *106-07.
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ful.153 Further, a utility that fails to implement design changes now may
lose control over the type of design or technology-remediating devices
that it can use in the future. As in Re Central Illinois Light Co.,15 4 utili-
ties should recover expenses related to the prudent avoidance of a poten-
tial health hazard, or expenses incurred now to avoid potentially greater
costs later, if those expenses are prudently incurred. Thus, for example,
implementing effective EMF mitigation measures at a "reasonable cost"
or "low cost" would probably be prudent and recoverable. On the other
hand, converting an existing transmission line underground solely to re-
duce public exposure to EMFs may not be prudent, given the lack of
scientific evidence on EMF adverse health effects and the high costs of
putting a line underground. 155
In its prudence reviews, commissions will need to balance the public's
health and safety concerns with ratepayers' interest in not paying for un-
necessary utility expenditures. In balancing these concerns, a commis-
sion should consider the incentives that its decision will create for other
utilities. Permitting recovery generally will encourage utilities to imple-
ment prudent-avoidance measures, which, depending on the commission,
may be a desirable result. A commission that permits utilities to earn a
rate of return on EMF capital investments, however, may encourage util-
ities to overinvest in capital-intensive, EMF-reducing technologies. Reg-
ulators have solved similar problems in other unusual rate cases, 56 by
allowing utilities to recover their investments but disallowing a return or
a portion of the return thereon.
A factor not present in the MGP cases which may complicate a com-
mission's task in reviewing EMF-related costs is determining what con-
stitutes "prudent-avoidance" measures eligible for recovery. A question
that may arise is whether a utility's purpose in implementing a particular
EMF mitigation measure should matter for recovery purposes. Some
transmission-line configurations and designs reduce magnetic fields more
than others, but a utility may have chosen the configuration or design for
reasons other than to reduce EMFs, such as to avoid delays and opposi-
tion to constructing the line.15 7 Commissions will need to ask whether
prudent-avoidance measures that a utility takes to minimize opposition
to a line is bad faith or merely a reasonable business decision, or whether
commissions should penalize utilities for accommodating public fears
that science has not substantiated. The issue will arise, however, only
153. For example, if the utility is required to convert a line underground, this conver-
sion would be more expensive than if the utility had placed the line underground in the
first place.
154. 124 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 498 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1991).
155. Cf Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 151 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 30, 43 (Ha.
P.U.C. 1994) (stating that placing a new line underground would not constitute prudent
avoidance "because of the substantial cost that would be involved and the uncertainty
regarding the health effects of EMF exposure").
156. See infra text accompanying notes 171-87.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
1730 [Vol. 62
ELECTR OMA GNETIC FIELDS
where a utility has implemented measures that arguably constitute pru-
dent avoidance and a commission decides or a party argues that the costs
should be disallowed.
D. Ratemaking Treatment of Historic Costs if EMFs Are Later Found
To Be Benign
If EMFs are found to be benign,1 58 should regulators permit utilities
that voluntarily rerouted lines or spent significant sums of money to miti-
gate potential EMF harms to include in rate base and earn a return on
that portion of the capital investment related to EMF mitigation?'5 9
Even if a commission allows a utility to recover current EMF-related
expenses, if EMFs are later found to be benign, a commission could ex-
clude the portion of the capital investment related to EMFs from rate
base. When a utility seeks to include EMF-related property in rate base
or recover EMF-related costs, the commission must decide who should
pay for the utility's incorrect prediction or arguably over-conservative
reaction to EMF health risks, which at the time may have been consid-
ered "prudent avoidance."
A useful analogue, although by no means identical, is the excess capac-
ity issue,leo which arose when utilities incorrectly forecasted energy de-
mands and some built nuclear facilities that were later canceled or
contributed to a utility system's excess capacity.' 6 1 In this EMF hypo-
thetical, where EMFs are found to be benign, the utility similarly has
incorrectly "forecasted" the scientific outcome of the health effects from
EMFs, and it consequently invested in technologies or routes that make
the transmission line more expensive than it would have been if the util-
ity had not reacted at all to the EMF issue.' 62 In both cases, regulators
158. Although science cannot prove a negative, over time, a variety of experiments and
studies that obtain negative results can persuade the scientific community to agree that
there is no significant risk from EMFs. See M. Granger Morgan, Prudent Avoidance,
Pub. Util. Fort., Mar. 15, 1992, at 26.
159. If the costs were operating expenses and the commission has already approved
their recovery, then the utility commission generally cannot require the utility to refund
these monies to ratepayers. The doctrine against retroactive ratemaking prohibits either
the refunding or raising of rates to compensate for either over-earnings or under-earnings
for service provided in the past, unless the utility had first obtained approval from the
utility commission to expense an item or include an investment into rate base, subject to
refund or a true-up later. Thus, if EMFs are later determined to be benign, the most
likely ratemaking issue to arise is whether the utility should be allowed to continue in-
cluding in ratebase the remaining portion of the EMF-related capital investment and
earning a return thereon.
160. Although the issue to build nuclear power plants also involved risks of possible
nuclear accidents and problems of nuclear waste disposal, these risks are not analogous to
the EMF hypothetical because at the time the utility decided to build, these risks were
known and regulated, whereas under this EMF hypothetical, they are not.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 109-17.
162. Also, in both cases, if the utility had decided not to invest in new capacity, and
the nation's energy demands increased, or the utility decided not to invest in EMF-miti-
gating technology, and EMFs were found to be harmful, the outcome would be equally, if
not more, costly. If the nuclear industry had decided not to build new power plants and
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must allocate the historical capital costs of these "mistakes in
retrospect."1 63
In the nuclear-excess-capacity cases, many commissions denied recov-
ery of portions of nuclear plants representing excess capacity under both
the used and useful and prudent-investment tests. 16' Similarly, in the
EMF hypothetical, under the used and useful test, a commission could
find all of the utility's property used and useful except that part related to
mitigating EMF. Although the EMF-reducing technology or property
may still be "used," it is no longer "useful" or necessary in providing
service to customers, and current ratepayers do not derive any benefit
from the EMF-reducing design technologies or other property used to
minimize EMFs. Under the prudence standard, a commission could find
that the utility's extra measures were unnecessary and wasteful, given
that EMFs had not been determined to be hazardous at the time of the
investment.
The following hypothetical is illustrative: a utility builds a line costing
$1 million, and $500,000 of that sum was spent to reduce EMFs. The
utility includes in rate base the $1 million minus $50,000 a year for de-
preciation. After 10 years, the scientific evidence overwhelmingly sup-
ports a conclusion that EMFs are not harmful. At this time, a
the nation's energy needs increased, the consequences would be more costly than over-
investment. See Pierce, supra note 113, at 540. In the case of the EMF hypothetical, if
the electric industry forgoes implementing prudent-avoidance measures, and EMFs arc
later found to be harmful, then many people will have been unnecessarily exposed to a
health hazard, and ratepayers may pay higher rates than would have been necessary if the
utility had implemented prudent avoidance earlier.
163. Pierce, supra note 113, at 498. In the case of the nuclear projects, Professor
Pierce has argued that although the obvious solution would appear to be allowing com-
plete recovery of costs if the forecasts were unavoidable, three problems prevent the util-
ity from recovering all of these costs: (1) full recovery would increase consumers' electric
bills without any corresponding benefit; (2) full recovery completely insulates the indus-
try from risks and mistakes that the regulated market must bear; and (3) the decisions
relating to nuclear plants to overinvest were in part due to a flaw in cost-of-service
ratemaking which creates an incentive for utilities to overinvest in capital investments.
See id. at 542-43. Professor Pierce argues that the proper ratemaking treatment of excess
capacity must take into consideration this regulatory incentive to overinvest. See id.
These same problems might also be present in the EMF hypothetical where EMFs are
found to be benign. First, customers would face rate increases, although perhaps not as
dramatic as in the case of the nuclear-power-plant cases, for which they receive no bene-
fit. Second, in an unregulated market, a firm would bear the risk that its product might
be defective or might pose unforeseeable dangers, and thus full recovery would be a dra-
matic departure from the way the unregulated market performs. Third, to the extent the
decision to build differently permits the utility to overinvest, for example, by implement-
ing technologies or designs more capital intensive than available alternatives, then the
incentive to overinvest arguably also exists in the EMF context. Professor Pierce suggests
that the Iowa Public Service Commission adopted "the most promising approach" to the
excess capacity cases, which was to allow recovery of the capital investment, but to re-
duce a "utility's rate of return by an amount proportionate to the amount of excess capac-
ity on the utility's system." Id. at 540-41 (citing Re Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 339 (Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1982)).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 109-117.
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commission could prohibit the utility from including into rate base the
portion attributable to EMF reduction, which after 10 years would be
$250,000, and the commission could limit the amount of depreciation to
$25,000 a year. Alternatively, the commission could allow the utility to
include the $250,000 of EMF-related property into rate base and deny a
return on the investment, thus, in effect, allocating the costs between
shareholders and ratepayers. Commissions sometimes have used the lat-
ter alternative in the atypical nuclear cases16s and MGP cleanup cases.166
For equitable reasons, however, where the utility implemented pru-
dent-avoidance measures partly as a result of public pressure or commis-
sion encouragement, utility commissions may be reluctant to disallow the
EMF-related investments in rate base and permit a return thereon. 67
Commissions might find it difficult to disallow recovery of costs related
to protecting the health and safety of the public, given the consequences
if EMFs had turned out to be harmful and the utility had done noth-
ing. 168 To the extent that commissions want to influence utility behavior,
allowing recovery of prudent health and safety costs, even if these costs
in hindsight are determined unnecessary, encourages utilities to be re-
sponsive to public and regulatory concerns as well as to err conserva-
tively in implementing measures that may protect public health and
safety.
E. Ratemaking Treatment of Future Expenses if EMFs Are Later
Found To Be Harmful
On the other hand, if a utility chose not to implement EMF-reducing
design technologies when it constructed a transmission line, should regu-
lators allow that utility to pass on to ratepayers the costs of retrofitting or
converting the line underground if EMFs are later determined to be
harmful? Should commissions allow a utility to pass on to ratepayers the
costs of defending litigation claims that EMFs from the line caused per-
sonal and property damages if the utility reasonably could have sited the
line differently to avoid human exposure? Because the prudence stan-
dard in the utility context is essentially a negligence standard, 69 a com-
mission could rule that a utility was imprudent if the utility builds a line
close to schools or other sensitive areas in disregard of human exposure
165. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary
Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 Geo. L.J. 2031, 2056 (1989) (discussing
risk allocation as a third alternative for disallowing costs associated with excess capacity
and canceled plants).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 178-87; Re Coal Tar Cleanup Expenditures,
137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 272 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1992).
167. Cf Colton, supra note 106, at 427-31 (discussing policy and constitutional consid-
erations affecting prior regulatory encouragement of capacity expansion).
168. See In re Application of Chesapeake Utils. Corp., No. 8157, 1989 Md. PSC
LEXIS 81 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989).
169. See Pierce, supra note 113, at 511.
1994] 1733
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to EMFs when there were reasonable alternatives.17° In contrast, regula-
tors may find that not taking a particular EMF-mitigating action is pru-
dent if the utility could show that it fully considered the EMF issues and
reasonable alternatives before it sited and built the line.
In many ways, the recovery issues associated with EMF-related costs
if EMFs are found to be harmful are similar to the recovery issues now
confronted by the natural gas industry in the cleanup of manufactured-
gas plant (MGP) sites. During the late 1800s and first half of the 1900s,
MGPs manufactured gas from coal to use the gas for lighting and later,
heating and other uses.' 7' Gas manufacturing produced residuals, such
as coal tars, coke, light oils, sludges, ash, and clinker, which at the time
were not regulated as hazardous wastes or known to be harmful to the
health and safety of the environment or people. 172 Although gas manu-
facturers sold or recycled some of these residuals, common industry
practice during this time was to deposit residuals that could not be sold
or recycled into dumps or ponds.' 73 With the advent of the natural gas
transmission industry after World War II, natural gas replaced manufac-
tured gas.' 74 When gas manufacturers dismantled the MGP sites, they
disposed of or left some wastes at the site.' 75 Today, former MGP sites
are significant liabilities for gas companies, because the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act' 76 ("CER-
CLA") and similar state legislation require them to clean up these
sites. 177
In the MGP cases, every commission to address the issue has allowed
a gas company to recover, either in whole or part, the costs associated
with the investigation or remediation of an MGP site.'7 8 Two issues con-
170. Cf Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508,
519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (overturning $25 million punitive damage award against utility
for "callous disregard" in deciding to build a line on property near two schools); Lazaz-
zera v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 90-0265, 1992 Ill. PUC LEXIS 163 (Ill. Com-
merce Comm'n May 28, 1992), rescinded on rehearing, 1992 Ill. PUC LEXIS 440 (Nov.
24, 1992) (in a complaint that a transmission line was located too close to a residence in
part because of alleged adverse EMF-health effects, the commission found that the utility
failed to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and therefore, the com-
mission required the utility to relocate the line away from plaintiff's home).
171. See 2 David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, Energy Law & Transactions
50.02[1][a] (1993).
172. See Re Coal Tar Cleanup Expenditures, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 272, 276,
282 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1992), affid, Central Ill. Light Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 626 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. App. 1993).
173. See id. at 276-77.
174. See id. at 276.
175. See id. at 277.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1988).
177. See, e.g., John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993) (pur-
chaser of gas and electric company held responsible for cleanup costs of coal gas and oil
gas wastes caused by predecessor).
178. For a comprehensive and insightful examination of the rate recovery issues associ-
ated with MGP sites, see Paul K. Connolly, Jr., Scott J. Mueller, Meabh Purcell, Envi-
ronmental Legacies of Manufactured Gas Plants - Rate Recovery of the Clean-up Costs,
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sistently arise in the MGP cases, however: one, whether the company
was prudent at the time it deposited the residuals; 7 9 and two, whether
current ratepayers derive any benefit from these cleanups, or stated an-
other way, whether the remediation costs are "operating costs."' 80 In a
generic proceeding to consider the issue of recovery of MGP cleanup-
related expenses, the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC") found that
industry practice at the time MGPs were operated and retired was "rea-
sonable and prudent." 18' Therefore, the ICC created a presumption that
"the operation and retirement of the Illinois MGPs were in conformity
with industry practices at the time, and that individual company opera-
tions and retirements of MGPs were reasonable and prudent."'8 2 Other
commissions have similarly found that the gas manufacturing industry's
disposal practices years ago were prudent. 8 3
With respect to the second issue, however, the ICC concluded that the
MGP cleanup costs did not benefit current ratepayers. Therefore, the
ICC announced that ratepayers and shareholders should share the costs,
by denying the utility the recovery of carrying costs on the unrecovered
balance of cleanup costs.'8 Commissions that require cost sharing be-
tween shareholders and ratepayers believe denial of the carrying cost of
deferred cleanup costs will act as an incentive for utilities "vigorously
[to] pursue potentially responsible parties and insurance claims."' 85 In
contrast, the Iowa Utilities Board and a number of other commissions
found that MGP costs do benefit ratepayers because these costs are "cur-
rent... and are legitimate costs of doing business."'18 6 These commis-
sions generally allow utilities to collect remediation costs entirely from
Original Presentation for the 13th Annual Legal Forum of the American Gas Association
(1994). Some commissions permit the utility to defer the costs, for which ratemaking
treatment will be determined later. See Peoples Nat. Gas, 144 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
333 (Minn. P.U.C. 1993). Others require utilities to amortize the costs over several years,
with or without a carrying charge. See Re Coal Tar, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at
301. Others permit recovery of a representative amount. See Re Midwest Gas, 133 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 380 (Iowa Utils. Bd. 1992).
179. See Connolly et al., supra note 178.
180. See Re Coal Tar, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 282.
181. Id. at 281.
182. Id. at 282.
183. See Re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., No. EE91111747, 1993 WL 50943 (NJ. Bd.
Regulatory Commissioners Feb. 3, 1993); Re Midwest Gas, 133 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
4th 380 (Iowa Utils. Bd. 1992); In re Chesapeake Utils. Corp., No. 8157, 1989 Md. PSC
LEXIS 81, at *9 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 9, 1989); In re Peoples Gas Sys., Inc.,
No. 850811-GU, 1986 Fla. PUC LEXIS 586, at *32 (Fla. P.U.C. July 8, 1986).
184. See Re Coal Tar, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 300.
185. See Re Wisconsin Power & Light Co., No. 6680-UR-108 (Wisc. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Sept. 30, 1993) (LEXIS, Energy Library, ALLPUR file).
186. Re Midwest Gas, 133 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th at 389; see Re Northern States
Power Co., 73 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 395, 420 (Minn. P.U.C. 1985); Chesapeake
Utils. Corp., 1989 Md. PSC LEXIS 81; Re Jersey Power & Light Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 175, 178 (NJ. Bd. Pub. Utils. 1985). One California utility argued that cur-
rent ratepayers derive benefits that its predecessors did not enjoy, thus "evening out"
benefits and costs among intergenerational ratepayers:
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ratepayers, and some commissions reasoned that recovery was necessary
to encourage utilities to clean up the sites.18 7 Commissions confronted
with tough recovery issues often consider the incentives their decisions
will create for a utility; as these cases demonstrate, however, commis-
sions do not always agree on which message they want to send.
If EMFs are found to be harmful, then the situation is similar in some
ways to the MGP cases: in the MGP cases and the EMF hypothetical,
the actions have posed a health hazard all along, but we only discovered
the hazardous nature of the "products" recently. Because we probably
will not know definitively anytime soon whether EMFs are harmful,'8 8
future commissions in EMF cases will confront the same difficulties as
commissions currently involved in MGP cases in evaluating decisions
that utilities made years ago. In both cases, eliminating or reducing the
health hazards will be very expensive.
EMF cases, however, differ from MGP cases in three major respects,
the first two of which will affect how commissions apply the prudence
standard. First, and on one hand, the EMF hypothetical is different be-
cause utilities arguably have known, or should have known, that EMFs
may be a health hazard, whereas during their period of operation, MGP
owners had no reason to believe that gas manufacturing byproducts were
unsafe. 18 9 The issue of when utilities are on notice that EMFs may be
harmful is critical both in the ratemaking context and the tort context.
Although at this time it is doubtful that commissions would impute
knowledge of a hazard to utilities, because there is no scientific evidence
to conclude that EMFs are harmful, a court or agency could conceivably
impute to a utility knowledge that EMFs may be a health hazard and
consequently conclude that the utility should have taken precautions.
Thus, a commission arguably could find that a utility that constructed a
line without due regard to EMF concerns was imprudent in not antici-
pating the possibility that EMFs may be found hazardous. 90
"Over the years, these transmission systems have largely been depreciated
and, in a sense, paid for themselves. Today's customers then get a very substan-
tial, very low cost gas transmission service from those gas pipeline[s].
So, today's customers get a very substantial benefit from what amounts to
yesterday's activities. The point I was making here is that we can't ... draw
such fine distinctions between yesterday's benefits and yesterday's costs versus
today's benefits and today's costs, because they get merged, and they get
blended."
In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 86-12-095, 1986 Cal. PUC LEXIS 886, at *99 (Dec.
22, 1986) (quoting PG&E witness testimony).
187. See In re Ratemaking Treatment for Remediation of Hazardous Waste, 115 Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 275, 277 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1990); Re Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 140 Pub. Utils. Rep. (PUR) 4th 481 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1993).
188. See M. Granger Morgan, Prudent Avoidance, Pub. Util. Fort., March 15, 1992, at
26 (stating that it is likely to take more than a decade to conclude whether EMFs pose
"any significant risk to public health").
189. See In re Coal Tar Cleanup Expenditures, 137 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 272,
277, 282 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1992).
190. Cf Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Klein Indep. School Dist., 739 S.W.2d 508,
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Second, and on the other hand, most jurisdictions require utilities to
obtain commission approval before constructing and operating a line,
whereas approval was not generally required for the construction of
MGPs.' 9' In these jurisdictions, and particularly in cases where a com-
mission actually considered EMFs during the decision on whether to al-
low a utility to construct a line, a utility commission might be hard-
pressed to declare, for example, that a utility imprudently constructed a
line along a preapproved route because of the risks associated with
EMFs. Future commissions would most likely find that a utility's failure
to mitigate EMFs today prudent, because of the lack of evidence of EMF
health effects available at the time the utility made the decision to build,
the difficulty in proving imprudence,'92 and the inequity of determining
the prudence of actions that a utility took decades ago.1 9 3
The third difference between the MGP cases and the EMF hypotheti-
cal affects how commissions can apply the used and useful standard to
utilities' property. In the MGP cases, often the utilities no longer use, or
even own, the property where they perform the cleanups, 194 whereas
many of the costs that utilities will incur to minimize EMFs will be re-
lated to property used in providing service to customers (i.e., the trans-
mission lines and rights-of-way). EMF mitigation measures will
therefore be more directly related to the provision of utility service than
are MGP-cleanup costs. These differences do not, however, mean that
attempts to recover EMF-related costs, if EMFs are later found to be
harmful, will meet with any less opposition or uncertainty than similar
attempts in the MGP cases. Utilities that failed to consider EMF mitiga-
tion when constructing a line may later confront ratepayer opposition to
paying for EMF mitigation that the utility could have implemented ear-
519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (landowner alleged that utility's decision to take an easement of
his property, which served as a campus for two schools, was an abuse of discretion and a
"callous disregard for the safety, health, and well-being of the 3,000 plus children" at-
tending the schools, and the jury below agreed and awarded the landowner S 104,275 in
actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages, and the appeals court upheld the
actual damages award, but overturned the punitive damages award because the utility did
not commit a tort for which punitive damages could be assessed); Lazazzera v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 133 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 495 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1992)
(requiring utility to relocate line running along alleyway behind complainant's home to
four-lane street and forest preserve away from residences, in part as a remedy for the
utility's failure to obtain a certificate; however, complaint raised concerns about safety of
line, including EMFs), rescinded on rehearing, No. 90-0265, 1992 Ill. PUC LEXIS 440
(Ill. Commerce Comm'n Nov. 24, 1992).
191. See Environmental Research & Technology Inc., Handbook on Manufactured
Gas Plant Sites 3-58 to 3-59 (1984) (omitting any reference to permits or other approvals
that might have been sources of information on history of MGPs).
192. See Pierce, supra note 113, at 512.
193. See William A. Badger, Prudence Reviews: New Approaches Are Needed, Pub.
Util. Fort., July 15, 1992, at 22, 25.
194. See eg., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 86-120-95, 1986 Cal. PUC LEXIS 886, at
*98 (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 22, 1986) (of the 74 sites where utility expected to conduct
cleanup, 43 were not owned by utility).
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lier, at less cost, and without having unnecessarily exposed people to
EMFs.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RECOVER AND ALLOCATION OF
EMF-RELATED COSTS
A. Recovery of Current EMF-Related Costs
Like other regulatory compliance costs, utilities should recover
mandatory EMF-related costs. Utilities incur these EMF-related costs
to comply with regulatory requirements, and therefore these costs are
necessary to the provision of current service. Although these costs are
subject to the prudent-investment test, regulators should only apply this
test to determine whether the costs that a utility incurred to satisfy the
regulatory requirements were reasonable or cost effective. There is no
need to inquire into the EMF-health risks at the time the utility made an
EMF-related investment. If a commission has preapproved EMF-related
expenditures, then it should likewise permit the utility to recover those
costs.
Where a commission has chosen not to regulate EMFs, and no scien-
tific consensus on the health effects of EMFs exists, the utility must de-
cide how best to respond to EMF issues. Commissions should interfere
in such decisions only if management abuses its discretion or acts in some
other imprudent manner. Utilities are statutorily required to provide
safe and reliable service. Voluntary prudent-avoidance costs are a legiti-
mate cost of providing safe service that regulators should review like any
other operating costs incurred by utilities: if the investment in EMF mit-
igation was prudent, based on information reasonably available at the
time the investment was made, regulators should permit the utility to
recover those costs.
The argument against assigning those costs to shareholders is that the
ratemaking process limits the amounts that utilities can collect, and
therefore, the ratemaking process should correspondingly limit the
amounts a utility can lose.195 The argument for requiring shareholders
to pay for EMF-related costs is that a utility should be responsible for the
risks that accompany the services it provides; but if regulators allow a
utility to recover these costs, then the risk has passed on to ratepayers.
Just as a firm in an unregulated market bears the risk that its product
may be defective, so too should regulated firms bear the risks inherent in
the products or services they sell. Utilities, however, are governed by
195. Cf Badger, supra note 193, at 25 (discussing rolling prudence reviews as a poten-
tial solution to minimizing risk of prudence disallowances); Lawrence Kolbe & William
B. Tye, Who Pays for Prudence Risk?, Pub. Util. Fort., Aug. 1, 1992, at 13 (arguing that
risk of prudence disallowances creates an asymmetric payoff structure when not "bal-
anced by an equivalent chance for gain"); Charles M. Studness, Implications of Impru-
dence Deregulation for Utility Financial Policy, Pub. Util. Fort., May 1, 1992, at 29
(predicting that in times of rising electric rates, imprudence disallowances will become
more likely).
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both regulation and market forces. Utilities are neither so regulated as to
be essentially operated by government, nor so unregulated as to be en-
tirely governed by market principles. Therefore, the risks that utilities
assume should not correspond to those assumed by either market entities
or government-run entities.
Utilities do assume risk, however. Utilities are only given an opportu-
nity to earn a reasonable return on their investments. Consequently, reg-
ulators expect utilities, both conceptually and politically, to assume some
business risks. In addition to business risks, utilities also assume risks
peculiar to regulated industries; because of the prospective nature of
ratemaking, utilities risk that they may incur greater costs than regula-
tors permitted them to recover, but future rates cannot compensate for
those losses.196 Another risk that utilities assume as a result of the
ratemaking process is "prudence risk," i.e., utilities risk that regulators
may disallow as imprudent expenditures that the utilities incurred.
There will always be some uncertainty about the ratemaking treatment of
EMF costs, and consequently regulators may be unable, under the cur-
rent cost-of-service ratemaking structure, to allocate definitively to utility
shareholders the risk that EMFs may later be determined harmful. For
example, a utility that fails to mitigate EMFs prudently now does not
bear the full risk that EMFs may later be determined harmful if ratepay-
ers may have to bail the utility out later. Similarly, ratemaking symme-
try does not exist if a utility is limited in the rates it collects, but
regulators may require the utility to absorb huge losses from EMF dam-
ages that are not necessarily the utility's fault. But this inability to allo-
cate risks definitively is not necessarily a flaw; rather, it appropriately
reflects the utility industry's quasi-regulated nature.
Moreover, utilities that are permitted to recover voluntary EMF-re-
lated costs will not have passed on to ratepayers the entire risk that
EMFs may be determined harmful. If a utility does not implement pru-
dent avoidance today, then a utility risks substantial financial and legal
liabilities if EMFs are later determined to be harmful, the costs of which
may or may not be recoverable from ratepayers. Similarly, if a utility
implements prudent-avoidance measures today, then the utility risks that
a commission may disallow the remainder of the utility's capital invest-
ment in EMF mitigation if EMFs are later found to be benign. Thus, the
utility still bears the risk that its service may be defective, but only if the
utility also bears the risk that a commission might deny recovery of the
costs if the utility's decision was imprudent at the time it was made.
Although this prudence risk is not as great as the risk that unregulated
firms assume for potentially defective products, this reduced risk is ap-
propriate if one accepts the symmetry argument above: that regulators
should limit both a utility's windfall gains and extraordinary losses.
196. Alternatively, utilities may incur fewer costs than permitted to recover and thus
make some short-term gains.
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B. The Allocation of EMF-Related Costs Among Ratepayers
In addition to the problem of assigning financial responsibility for
EMF costs between ratepayers and utility shareholders, if commissions
allow recovery, then the EMF cases raise issues about allocating the costs
among ratepayers themselves. Ratepayers who are exposed to EMFs be-
cause of their proximity to the line have different interests than those
who do not live or work near any lines. Allocating EMF-related costs
among all ratepayers may be unfair to those who do not receive any ben-
efit from those costs. If a utility recovers from all ratepayers costs spent
in minimizing EMFs from a distribution line or a line that services a
discrete portion of a service area, then all ratepayers will be subsidizing
the few ratepayers who benefit from reduced fields.' 97 Moreover, if utili-
ties spent additional costs to select a different route for the line because of
opposition by one group of ratepayers, it would be even more unfair to
require the people exposed to EMFs because of the new route to pay for
the increased costs associated with the route change.
One possible solution is to give ratepayers more policy-making respon-
sibility19 to reflect more accurately the risks they bear.199 Ratepayers
are likely to vary widely in their tolerances and perceptions of risk. Reg-
ulators could give ratepayers a voice in how to reduce the purported
risks, given the mitigating measures' respective costs and what is cur-
rently known about the health risks of EMFs. Commissions could give
those who live nearby transmission and distribution lines more responsi-
bility to decide whether and how to respond to the uncertain risks."
Allowing residents to choose whether to pay for "extras" not otherwise
required in the provision of service is not new.20  For example, several
state statutes authorize the governing body to create local improvement
districts upon the initiative of either a governing body or a majority of
property owners in the proposed district for the purpose of converting
197. The argument is also raised in opposition to demand-side management programs,
where all ratepayers are assigned the cost of the program from which only a few receive
the benefits of reduced energy bills.
198. Commission staff and ratepayer interest groups represent ratepayers or the public
interest to a large degree already, however.
199. Cf Joseph P. Tomain, Law and Policy in the Activist State: Rethinking Nuclear
Regulation, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 187, 234 (1986) (arguing that, to realign financial and
policy-making responsibility in the nuclear regulatory arena, either the ratepayers should
be given more policy-making responsibility or those responsible for the costs should take
more responsibility for their risks).
200. See, e.g., Philip S. McCune, The Power Line Health Controversy: Legal Problems
and Proposals for Reform, 24 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 429, 466 (quoting one citizen as stating
"We're going to pay for [power-line construction] if [the lines are] above ground [or]
buried .... We consumers are paying for it, and we want to have a say in what
happens.").
201. See Undergrounding Pol'y Advisory Comm., Electric Undergrounding Policy
Recommendation Report, at 1-2 (July 27, 1993) (prepared for the Colorado Springs City
Council).
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existing overhead electric transmission lines to underground locations."°
If at any time during the required public hearing "the governing body is
presented with a petition signed by at least a majority of the property
owners owning at least a majority of the assessable land of the proposed
district protesting the proposed improvement,... the district and project
shall be abandoned." 203 Utilities assess the costs of converting the lines
underground upon the properties that benefit from the conversion. 204
Although legislatures enacted these statutes several decades ago for aes-
thetic reasons, similar regulatory initiatives are emerging to allow resi-
dents to choose whether they wish to pay for costs to reduce EMFs while
the health effects of EMFs are still unknown.205
For example, Kansas Power & Light Company filed a tariff that re-
quired residents, who proposed a route different from the one that the
utility proposed because, among other reasons, of concerns about EMFs,
to pay for the extra costs in siting the line along the alternative route.2 06
The tariff provided:
If any governmental subdivision requires Company to construct, re-
move, or relocate ("change") Distribution or Transmission facilities
("required facilities") when Company, absent such requirement, would
do otherwise, and where the recovery of the additional cost for such
change is not otherwise provided for, the cost incurred by Company to
202. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-8 (West 1990); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35.96.030
(West 1990); Utah Code Ann., § 54-8-4 (1993).
203. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-8-112(4) (West 1990). The Colorado statute was up-
held against constitutional attack in Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 533 P.2d 1129, 1132-
33 (Colo. 1975).
204. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35.96.030 (West 1990). The Colorado Springs City
Council adopted another variation, applicable to placing new and existing lines under-
ground: it appointed a citizens committee to develop recommendations for a policy to
place transmission lines underground. The Citizens Committee recommended that new
overhead lines in developed areas be placed underground, and that a System Improve-
ment Fund be created through a monthly customer charge to finance the additional cost
of placing an existing line underground:
Th[e] fund would be made available on a matching basis to provide neighbor-
hoods, private interests or public entities a mechanism to share the cost of bury-
ing power lines. If not used as a matching fund, procedures would allow for the
fund to be used to bury lines providing the most aesthetic benefit to the entire
community.
Undergrounding Pol'y Advisory Comm., supra note 201, at 2.
205. In a survey of electric utilities across the country, utilities reported that they
choose the following options for financing new transmission lines underground:
[T]he most popular option for financing the additional cost of underground
transmission, mentioned by 17 Utilities (73.9%) was to pass the costs on to all
ratepayers. Obtaining financing from property developers was also mentioned
by 8 Utilities (34.8%). Monies from the Principal User(s) of a line was cited by
3 Utilities (13.0%), and from Local Government by 2 Utilities (8.7%). Financ-
ing by Franchise Agreements, by Improvement Districts, and by Localized
Surcharges were each cited once.
Id at app. D summary.
206. See KPL, City Agree Residents Seeking Line Rerouting Should Cover Costs, Util.
Envtl. Rep., Mar. 19, 1993, at 9.
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make such change shall be assessed against the customers located
within the governmental subdivision through a monthly surcharge
207
The utility estimated that the cost of its proposed route was $733,552,
and the route preferred by the neighborhood association, $1,088,903.
The City Commission unanimously granted the permit for the line along
the neighborhood's preferred route, and "unanimously recommended to
the [utility] Commission that the surcharge tariff be based on a per cus-
tomer basis over a five year period. '20 8
Although the cost-bearers and those living near transmission lines
would have a greater say in how much risk they are willing to tolerate
and how much they are willing to spend to reduce that risk, this potential
solution creates other problems. Alternative routes that are chosen be-
cause of their ability to avoid more people will almost always place the
line in someone else's backyard. If ratepayers like those in Lawrence,
Kansas pay for alternative routes to avoid exposure to EMFs, then peo-
ple who otherwise would not have been exposed to EMFs if the first
group of residents had not "paid" to avoid the utility's proposed route
will face EMF exposure. In addition, the second group of residents, or
any other residents who may be affected by a line's proposed route, may
be unable to afford higher electric rates due to EMF reduction or may be
unable to organize politically to oppose the proposed route. Thus, mod-
erate and high income residents might be able to eliminate lines in their
backyards, and the utility would build the lines in the neighborhoods
with residents who are least able either to object to a proposed line or to
pay for EMF mitigation.
Giving ratepayers more policy-making responsibility for the risks they
bear may be an appropriate solution for resolving aesthetic issues, or
even for determining whether utilities should place existing lines under-
ground on the basis of public concern over EMFs or retrofit existing lines
that service a discrete group of ratepayers, such as distribution lines or
rural lines. The costs associated with these changes directly relate to the
service these residents receive and the rates they pay for that service.
The Colorado and Washington statutes can serve as models for states
that wish to provide their citizens in these situations with the choice of
whether to place a line underground.
Issues arise, however, if commissions give ratepayers a greater role in
choosing where to locate a proposed line or how to construct a proposed
line. First, if commissions allow ratepayers to choose whether to pay the
207. In re Western Resources, Inc., dba KPL, Relocation of Facilities Tariff (April 14,
1993) (filed with the St. Corp. Comm'n of Kan., No. 93WSRE323TAR).
208. Letter from City of Lawrence to Susan Cunningham, Legal Department, Kansas
Corp. Comm'n, dated (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with author). At least one other utility is
also considering allowing specific customers to pay for EMF abatement. See Puget Power
Considering Voluntary EMF Abatement Option on Customer Bills, Elec. Power Alert,
Feb. 17, 1993, at 7.
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additional costs to locate a line somewhere else, then unless the commis-
sion also prohibited the ratepayers who would be affected by the second
proposed route from proposing yet a third route, conceivably, utilities
could never build transmission lines. For similar reasons, local govern-
ments are prohibited from dictating where or how a line should be built:
If [the city] had the right by its ordinance to specify how [the utility]
should design and install its transmission lines or require it to spend
this substantially greater sum in constructing said lines, then other mu-
nicipalities would have like authority.... If 100 such municipalities
each had the right to impose its own requirements with respect to in-
stallation of transmission facilities, a hodgepodge of methods of con-
struction could result and costs and resulting capital investment could
mushroom. As a result, the supervision and control by the Public Ser-
vice Commission with respect to the company, its facilities, its method
of operation, its service, its indebtedness, its investment, and its rates
which the General Assembly obviously contemplated would be
nullified.2°9
Moreover, this solution could unfairly affect fixed-income residents
and residents least able to organize politically. If residents can essen-
tially "buy" a route or "buy" underground protection, then only those
neighborhoods that can afford it will be protected from exposure. Fi-
nally, regulators should leave the decision of where to locate and how to
construct a transmission line to the utility, subject to the reasonableness
reviews that utility commissions conduct in siting proceedings.Y" There
is no consensus on what constitutes "prudent avoidance," '  and there
cannot be until we know more about EMFs' effects. The decision of
whether to implement prudent avoidance should be left to the preroga-
tive of utility management. Although there is no guarantee that a utility
will not choose neighborhoods least able to oppose a transmission line,
the utility is more likely to be driven by total cost and other logistics in
deciding where to locate a transmission line, rather than entirely by
neighborhood opposition.212
When utilities decide to implement prudent-avoidance measures, other
209. Florida Power Corp. v. Seminole County, 579 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991) (quot-
ing Union Elec. Co. v. City of Crestwood, 499 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Mo. 1973)).
210. Cf Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 151 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 30, 41-42 (Ha.
P.U.C. 1994) (in responding to argument that the district in which a line was proposed
contained a disproportionate share of "negative impacts" of such lines, the commission
said: "[w]hile we sympathize with the residents ... who will be directly affected by
HECO's proposed overhead transmission lines in this docket, we will not, without addi-
tional justification, order HECO to place the ... lines underground for social equity
reasons.").
211. See supra text accompanying note 41.
212. For a proposal to provide utilities with incentives to select the route that reduces
EMF exposure at the lowest cost, see Morgan et al., supra note 92. In some areas, the
neighborhood develops near preexisting transmission lines. See Re Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., No. 890057 (June 13, 1991) (LEXIS, Energy Library, ALLPUR file) (noting
that plaintiff residents moved into the area after the transmission line was built).
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than those assignable to a specific residential group, commissions should
permit utilities to allocate these costs among all ratepayers, rather than
charge only those whose property the line traverses. These costs should
be allocated among all ratepayers because these costs are system costs,
i.e., costs incurred in the provision of safe electric service to all.213 By
contrast, it is fair to assess charges to property owners who benefit from
distribution lines placed underground because individual property own-
ers almost exclusively enjoy the benefits. Moreover, if EMFs are later
determined to be harmful, arguably all ratepayers will have derived bene-
fits from prudent-avoidance measures that a utility took earlier: ratepay-
ers who live near the lines receive benefits from reduced magnetic fields,
and all ratepayers receive benefits from avoiding significantly higher
costs in implementing design changes to existing lines. If EMFs are
found to be benign, no group benefits to the exclusion of others.2 4
CONCLUSION
While the health risks of EMFs remain uncertain, both utilities and
the public must face choices about how to respond to these uncertainties.
The individual has some control in whether to reduce his or her exposure
to EMFs by, for example, not using electric blankets, but for the most
part, because EMFs are as ubiquitous as electricity, an individual cannot
completely avoid EMFs. The industries whose products or services are
associated with EMFs are in the best position to reduce potential risks,
and they have the most control over who and how many people will be
exposed to the risks their products or services create. Therefore, those
who produce EMFs, including electric utilities, should decide whether to
initiate prudent safety and health measures, at least while there is no
conclusive scientific basis to conclude that EMFs cause adverse health
effects, and regulators should not discourage them from doing so.
213. The argument that it is unfair for some ratepayers to pay for the costs of EMF-
reduction if they do not derive any benefits from those costs weakens when the treatment
of similar costs is reviewed. For example, all ratepayers share in the costs of rate pro-
ceedings, where the utility's interests are often in direct conflict with the ratepayers' inter-
ests and where the utility argues for the allocation of charges to the benefit of some
ratepayers and to the detriment of others; and all ratepayers share in the costs of other
transmission-line safety measures, which may only benefit those in proximity to the line,
utility employees, or other discrete groups.
214. One group that may benefit is the ratepayers whose aesthetic sensibilities were
spared because a line was rerouted to avoid their properties. However, this merely main-
tains the status quo: utilities build lines on some residents' property and not on others,
but those whose property is significantly affected are theoretically adequately
compensated.
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